Book IV. The Solving of Dilemmas: Chapter 8

141:3 It will be noticed that (the destruction of the Âsavas being Arahatship, not Buddhahood) this is really no reply. 141:4 Makkho, 'depreciation of the good qualities of others,' says Hînati-kumburê, pp. 427, 564. But the use of the word at Gâtaka I, 385; Mahâvagga I, 15, 4; Kullavagga III, 34, 2; Magghima Nikâya I, 15, shows that concealing one's own faults is rather the meaning. 141:5 Pâlâso; not in Childers. But see Anguttara Nikâya II, 6, 12; Puggala Paññatti II, 2; Magghima Nikâya I, 15, &c. This and the last are usually mentioned together (see for instance below, VII, 2, 18), and the contrast is 'concealing the faults one has, and laying claim to virtues one has not.' 141:6 Mâyâ. It is noteworthy that this famous word, which plays so great a part in the later philosophies, and which is often supposed p. 142 to express a fundamental conception of the Buddhists, has not yet been traced, and will probably never be found, in the Pitakas, in any other than this subordinate and purely ethical sense. So when Mr. Gough in his 'Philosophy of the Upanishads' says, p. 186, that 'pessimism, metempsychosis, and mâyâ (the primitive world fiction) are retained in Buddhism' he is as wrong about mâyâ as he is about metempsychosis. He is evidently still under the delusion that Buddhism teaches the transmigration of souls, and that it has inherited from such schoolmen as Sankarâkârya the theory of the mâyâ. This is as funny as the astounding blindness which makes him say (pp. 267, 268) 'there is no quest of verity of an active law of righteousness (in Buddhism), but only a yearning after a lapse into the void'(!). The converse proposition would be nearer to the actual fact, and the Buddhist Aviggâ is quite different from the Mâyâ of the later Vedântists. How absolutely different is the world in which the thoughts of a Buddhist would move is shown by Hînati-kumburê's gloss: 'The mâyâ of concealing faults one has' (tamâge œti aguna samgawana mâyâ).

142:1 Thambho (not 'stupor,' as Childers has it). 'That obstinacy of mind (dridhawû sit œti bawa) which will not bend to the exhortation of the great,' says the Simhalese. 142:2 Sârambho; not merely 'clamour, angry talk,' as Childers has it. See the commentary on the word sârambhî at Gâtaka III, 259, with which Hînati-kumburê here agrees. 'Contrariness' would be perhaps a better rendering. 142:3 Thînamiddham; so Hînati-kumburê (but he takes them as two). 142:4 Tandî, as Hînati-kumburê reads (for Mr. Trenckner's nandî). 142:5 Khudâ pipâsâ, which must be taken separately to make up the twenty-five. The Simhalese takes them as two. 142:6 Arati, which the Simhalese (taking thîna and middha separately) omits. 143:1 Pariyâdiyimsu; literally 'were suffused as to the body of' (Hînati-kumburê has sarîrayehi vyâpta wû). The passive forms of this verb are always difficult to translate. See above, p. 254, and below, pp. 296, 297 (of the Pâli), and Kullavagga VI, 2, 6; VII, 2, 1. 143:2 This passage follows in the Mahâ Sakkaka Sutta immediately after the passage quoted above (Magghima Nikâya I, 246), and the p. 143 incident is also related at Gâtaka I, 57. But in both these books there is reference only to the first--not to the second, third, and fourth Ghânas. As this is therefore only another instance of the difference between the Pitakas and the more advanced views of our author, I have not translated the remaining Ghânas. As will be seen from the version of them in my 'Buddhist Suttas from the Pâli' (S. B. E., vol. xi, p. 272), the idea that a mere baby could have practised these higher meditations would only become possible after the Buddha theory had been much more developed than it is in the Pitakas.

144:1 Kusalam. So it has been already laid down at III, 7, 7 (pp. 83, 84 of the Pâli), that merit (puññam) is more than demerit. 145:1 This is a repetition of the list given above (I, 276-278), where the technical terms are explained. Compare Mr. William Andrews's book, 'Punishments in the Olden Time.' 145:2 Saparivâram dânam. Pirikara-sahita-wû mahâ dan dî, says the Simhalese, p. 430. 145:3 The words in brackets are supplied from Hînati-kumburê. 146:1 The king himself has already mentioned them, in reverse order, above, I, 172. 146:2 The legends will be found in full in the Gâtaka stories numbered respectively, in Professor Fausböll's edition, 258, 533, 494, and 243. 146:3 Patikkhâdaniyam. See the note on Mahâvagga VI, 23) where this curious story is given in full. 146:4 See Gâtaka III, 495, 496 for this story. Âbhidosikam is not in Childers, but see the Sutta Vibhanga, Pârâgika I, 5, 6. 147:1 'Received from the king the great honour (sammâna) called sabbatthaka,' says Hînati-kumburê, p. 431. But we find a particular office so called at Gâtaka II, 57. (It is true the reading there is sabbatthaka, but Mr. Trenckner's reading is doubtless preferable.) 147:2 All these cases have already been referred to above, I, 172. 147:3 'Nandagutta of the Brahman caste,' says the Simhalese, p. 431. 147:4 Descended from the Sâkya race,' adds Hînati-kumburê. 148:1 The Pâli being otherwise unintelligible, the above version has been expanded in accordance with the Simhalese interpretation. Kavandha as a living headless trunk occurs already in the Sutta Vibhanga, Pârâgika IV, 9, 3.

148:1 The Pâli being otherwise unintelligible, the above version has been expanded in accordance with the Simhalese interpretation. Kavandha as a living headless trunk occurs already in the Sutta Vibhanga, Pârâgika IV, 9, 3. 148:2 Aparante. This may mean merely the western country (as at Gâtaka I, 98), or may be a specific place name as Aparântika is in the 'Indian Antiquary,' VII, 263. 148:3 So the Simhalese, which seems to follow a slightly different reading. 149:1 Upakakkhake. The word is not in the: Pâli dictionaries, but I follow Hînati-kumburê, p. 432, who renders it Kisilla, and the context at the parallel passage, Gâtaka I, 63 (see also Gâtaka I, 158, and the Sutta Vibhanga II, 260). 150:1 Bhettabbo, 'have their arms or legs broken.' 150:2 In this sentence the translation follows Hînati-kumburê, who has apparently had a different, and fuller, reading before him. 151:1 Petâ; which are not ghosts, disembodied 'souls,' but new beings whose link of connection with the departed is, 'not soul,' but Karma. 151:2 Vissotam, from sru. The Simhalese, p. 434, has âsthâna gata wanneya (for asthâna). 153:1 Vâmagâhino vikakkhukâ. Neither of these words are in the dictionaries. Hînati-kumburê, p. 436, says, 'who spoil what they take hold of, and whose eyes have lost their cunning.' 153:2 Otâra, which the Simhalese renders awakâsaya; and in that sense the word is used at Magghima Nikâya I, 334.

153:2 Otâra, which the Simhalese renders awakâsaya; and in that sense the word is used at Magghima Nikâya I, 334. 154:1 Pariyâdiyati. See the note above at IV, 8, 23. 154:2 A similar metaphor is used below, IV, 8, 55 (p. 311 of the Pâli). 154:3 This long list is made up of the two given above at pp. 35, p. 155 259 of the Pâli (Paragraphs II, 1, 10 and IV, 6, 55 of the translation). 155:1 The Buddhist Sabbath. See 'Buddhism,' pp. 140, 141. 155:2 Âvaggeya, which the Simhalese, p. 437, merely repeats, is ambiguous (literally cause to bend towards'). Compare Gâtaka I, 74, 89, 108, 171 11, 243. In most places the meaning 'bend back or towards' comes to have the secondary sense of 'reflect.' But throughout this discussion there is an underlying reference to a very beautiful Buddhist conception that a man can transfer to others the merit of any good deed he has done. Thus at the end of a palm-leaf manuscript the copyist often adds the pious wish: 'May the merit of my having made this copy redound to the advantage of all men,' or words to that effect. And the preceding metaphor would seem to show that this must be the secondary sense here attached to I causing to bend towards;'--the more he p. 156 spends (as it were) his virtue, the more remains, just as however much the water flows away from the spring, still quite as much remains, and he can still share with others that which is left. The doctrine of imputed righteousness is not confined to Buddhists, but the Buddhist theory is really quite different from the corresponding Western ideas, even from the Catholic doctrine of the transference of the righteousness of saints.

156:1 So already above, III, 7, 7 (I, 128). 156:2 Patilîyati patikutati pativattati na sampasârîyati. None of these words are in the dictionaries. 156:3 Na parivaddhate; literally 'is not dilated.' 157:1 Nimittam, aramunuwa in the Simhalese, p. 438. 157:2 Vâtiko, which Childers renders wrongly rheumatic. Wâta prakriti wâ, says the Simhalese, p. 438. 157:3 The Simhalese gives the different kinds of dreams seen by each of these six--the first dreams of journeys through space, the second of fire and conflagrations, the third of water, the fourth p. 158 of good or bad things according as the god is kindly or malignant, the fifth of what he has himself seen or heard, and the last of his future gain or loss. 159:1 Okkante middhe; 'like a monkey's sleep,' says Hînati-kumburê. 159:2 On bhavanga compare Abhidhammattha Sangaha III, 8. 159:3 'Like a bird that has re-entered its nest' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 159:4 Appativigânantassa, 'does not know the distinctions between bliss and woe (sukha dukkha vibhâga),' says the Simhalese, p. 440. 160:1 Nirodha, which the Simhalese repeats. Probably the fourth Ghâna is here referred to. 161:1 Onâho pariyoniho, 'obstruction, covering.' See the Tevigga Sutta, § 58. 161:2 Vokinnakamsaggati. 'Destroys sleep by scattered thoughts,' says the Simhalese, p. 441. 162:1 It is not known whether the whole of this theory of dreams is taken from the Pitakas, or whether it is an expansion of views there suggested. But the germs of the theory are certainly in the Pitakas. Thus the Buddha is made at Magghima Nikâya I, 249, 250 to say of himself that in his midday sleep be was neither stupefied nor the contrary (neither sammûlho nor asammûlho), which comes very near to the 'monkey's sleep' referred to throughout this dilemma.

162:2 Vilînani, wilikun wû says Hînati-kumburê (p. 442). 163:1 This simile has already been used above, IV, 3, 7 (I, 235). 163:2 Gati-patibâlhâ, gamana bâhulyatâwen says the Simhalese. 163:3 Upahat-abbhantaro, 'whose interior is burnt by the fierceness of the stomach fire' (gatharâgni-gahani), says Hînati-kumburê, p. 443. 164:1 Hînati-kumburê had apparently a different reading (perhaps ekamse na vadâmi). For he translates, p. 444, 'In this death I do not say that there is one cause.' 164:2 As was noticed above on p. 112 (of the Pâli), some of these medical terms are very uncertain, and the Simhalese gives no help. 164:3 Not traced in the Pitakas. 165:1 Sâmâyiko, 'timely,' but Childers says 'temporary,' and we have had the word above (p. 22 of the Pâli) in the sense of' religious.' The Simhalese, p. 445, repeats the word. 165:2 Yama-visaya, 'abode of the god of death.' 166:1 Sarnâhato. Compare above, pp. 181, 254 of the Pâli, and Magghima Nikâya I, 337. 171:1 Uparato, for which Hînati-kumburê, p. 449, has upahata wîyœyi. 171:2 Otaka-vitaka-âkinna. Ghanayawû patalawû âkîrnnawû says the Simhalese. 173:1 Mañgarita-patte, which the Simhalese renders karal patra œttâwû. 173:2 Karaka-vassam is pâsâna-warsha in the Simhalese. If karaka originally meant 'hard shell,' it could have reached its ordinary meaning of 'water-pot,' from the fact that an empty half of a cocoa-nut shell is the most common form of cup.

173:2 Karaka-vassam is pâsâna-warsha in the Simhalese. If karaka originally meant 'hard shell,' it could have reached its ordinary meaning of 'water-pot,' from the fact that an empty half of a cocoa-nut shell is the most common form of cup. 174:1 Vibhûtam katam is rendered prasiddha karana laddeya in the Simhalese, p. 451. 174:2 Parinibbutânam. The words in brackets are Hînati-kumburê's gloss, 'Of all who have been entirely set free' is an alternative, and perhaps a better, rendering. 175:1 Mr. Trenckner prints evam-nâma as qualifying Ketiya. The Simhalese, p. 451, takes it as I have rendered. 176:1 These words are very ambiguous, and unfortunately the Simhalese (p. 452), though much expanded, is equally so. The kind of wonder referred to throughout the dilemma is also doubtful. The only one of the kind mentioned, so far as I know, in the Pitakas is that referred to in the 'Book of the Great Decease,' V, 26, where the placing of garlands on a Ketiya produces calm in the heart. But it is difficult to believe that our author had merely a spiritual experience of this kind in his thoughts. The whole discussion points rather to the late date at which he wrote. 177:1 Theyya-samvâsaka. See Mahâvagga I, 69, 4. 177:2 Titthiya-pakkantaka, 'gone over to the Titthiyas.' 177:3 Garukâpatti, which Hînati-kumburê takes to be equivalent to the Samghâdisesa offences. This is doubtless correct, and the use of the phrase in that sense is a sign of our author's later date.

177:3 Garukâpatti, which Hînati-kumburê takes to be equivalent to the Samghâdisesa offences. This is doubtless correct, and the use of the phrase in that sense is a sign of our author's later date. 177:4 Viruddhâ, 'placed in a class' (woedœrum wû), says the Simhalese, p. 453. It is literally 'opposed,' and the idiom is curious. 178:1 The words in brackets are added from the Simhalese. 178:2 Similar metaphors have already been used in the 71st Dilemma (p. 283 of the Pâli) and in the 74th Dilemma (p. 295 of the Pâli). 179:1 In the text the whole comparison is repeated. 179:2 For a similar metaphor see above, IV, 8, 31 (p. 296 of the Pâli). 180:1 It is unknown what this kimi (insect, vermin, small creature) is, and it is not mentioned elsewhere. Susruta mentions a sârikâmukha insect, and as in one rare word at least, which the Pâli translator did not sufficiently understand to restore to the ordinary Pâli form (kalasi for karisi, see above, I, xxiii), we find la stood in our author's dialect for ri, there may be some connection between the two. It would be particularly interesting to be able to determine the species and habitat of this creature, as it might throw some light on the district in which our author flourished. 180:2 These measurements differ slightly from those given above, IV, 8, 14 (p. 282 of the Pâli), for a fine elephant. 180:3 Compare the tale of the frog who wanted to swallow the bull in Æsop's fables (not yet traced in the Gâtakas). Is the Sâlaka a kind of frog, much smaller than ours?

180:3 Compare the tale of the frog who wanted to swallow the bull in Æsop's fables (not yet traced in the Gâtakas). Is the Sâlaka a kind of frog, much smaller than ours? 180:4 So Hînati-kumburê, p. 455. 181:1 The following pages will seem only so much verbiage, and will convey no idea to a European reader, unless he realises that the Nirvâna discussed is of course not a salvation to be enjoyed by a 'soul' after death, and in some other world; but a state of mind to be realised and enjoyed by a man here, on this earth, in this life, and in this life only. Though I had pointed this out already in 1876 the animistic interpretation of Nirvâna is still the prevalent one, and still continues to lead to endless confusion. Why is it then, the reader may ask, that our author does not contradict the Christian interpretation of the Buddhist summum bonum in so many words? Simply because it never occurred to him as possible. It was probably even as inconceivable to him as the Buddhist interpretation of it seems to be to most Western writers. 181:2 This dilemma and the next have been translated into French in the 'Revue de l'histoire des Religions' for 1885 (vol. xi, pp. 336 and following). The author's name being given as Mr. Lewis da Sylva, of Colombo, the article as it stands is presumably a translation into French, made in Paris, of Mr. da Sylva's version in English from the Simhalese, which may account for the fact that there is scarcely a sentence which is not misleading.

183:1 In the Mâgandiya Sutta, No. 75 in the Magghima Nikâya, where the speech will be found at I, 502. 183:2 Bhûtahakke. See Mr. Trenckner's valuable note. Hînati-kumburê, p. 456, quotes the Pâli, reading Bhûtahu, and rendering it 'anabhiwriddhi-karanayek. 186:1 So the Pâli (vayam). But the Simhalese has wâsaya, 'dwelling-place,' throughout §§ 56 and 57. 186:2 Atthi-dhammassa nibbânassa. The Simhalese, p. 459, translates 'the form, &c., of the quality (dharma) of Nirvâna'--as if the Pâli were nibbâna-dhammassa. But see next page, note 2. 187:1 Lokakkhâyikâ, 'those who have in former days enquired into and described the world,' says the Simhalese. 187:2 Atthidhammassa again, which Hînati-kumburê now renders œti swabhawawû. 'Pourquoi réponds-tu ainsi au sujet de l'état naturel du grand océan,' says the French. (Compare above, p. 270 of the Pâli.) 187:3 Arûpakâyikâ. It is very odd that Hînati-kumburê takes the word here, and in the answer, as a feminine singular, and still p. 188 more so that the French translation takes it throughout as a masculine singular. But the Simhalese throughout the sequel treats it properly as a plural nominative; and there can be little doubt that the inhabitants, or some of the inhabitants, of the 'Formless Realm,' the Arâpâvakara or Arûpa-brahma-loka, are referred to. But this name is different from those given to any of these gods in Childers, and I cannot trace it in the Pitakas as applied to any of them.

188:1 I follow the Pâli, which still has vayam. The Simhalese has here and below winâsaya. 188:2 Atthisattanam yeva, which the Simhalese, p. 460, represents merely by œttâwû. 189:1 Aññehi anupavittham; 'not previously explained by others,' says Hînati-kumburê. Neither rendering is altogether satisfactory. Perhaps 'of which you have been convinced by others,' in agreement with the use of the word above, p. 270 of the Pâli. 189:2 In the French of Mr. da Sylva this sentence runs (p. 342): 'Mais vénérable, n'y a-t-il pas une vertu du Nirvâna dont on puisse percevoir quelque ressemblance.' 189:3 That is, no drop of water adheres to the lotus, though it is surrounded by water and water may fall on it. For instances of the frequent similes drawn from this fact see below, V, 14; and Dhammapada 401; Sutta Nipâta II, 14, 17; III, 9, 3 2; IV, 6, 9. The French translation is: 'de même que le lotus élève fièrement sa tête au-dessus de l'eau' (!). 190:1 On these fundamental conceptions see my notes in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 148, 149, where it is shown that the' three cravings' which end in Nirvâna are pretty much the same as the lust of the flesh, theism, and materialism. 190:2 Amata, the translation of which word by 'immortality' has given rise to so much confusion. So the French here says 'la médecine a le pouvoir de combattre la mort,' which is nearly as bad. See the Appendix. 191:1 See on this belief above, IV, 3, 39 (I, 269).

191:1 See on this belief above, IV, 3, 39 (I, 269). 191:2 The word used here for free, empty (suñña), has again given rise to the most odd misconceptions. As Nirvâna is hence called Sunyatâ, 'emptiness,' Christian writers (taking Nirvâna as a name for some kind of future life) have very naturally thought, in trying to fasten some meaning upon emptiness in a future life, that it must mean 'annihilation of a soul,' and have labelled Buddhism as Nihilism! The real meaning is really very simple, and entirely ethical (not metaphysical or animistic): 'Men may rise on stepping stones Of their dead selves to higher things.' See below, IV, 8, 78, for a metaphor founded on a similar idea. 191:3 Samkusumito, only found here. Compare 'garlands, vitvam,' 175, 176. 193:1 Anissitam, so below, p. 351 of the Pâli, the dhutangam is said to be anissitam. The translation is difficult. In our passage here Hînati-kumburê (p. 464) renders it, as applied both to space and to Nirvâna, by 'having no âsrawa.' Below, as applied to the vows (dhutangas), he renders it (p. 512) by 'unconnected with craving' (trishnânisrita). 'Self-dependent' or 'untarnished (by reliance on external things') would suit the context in all three passages. 194:1 This is butter made of buffaloes' milk, and is highly esteemed in India. 195:1 Not yet traced in the Pitakas. 195:2 'By the action of Karma as a pre-existing cause' is to be understood.

195:2 'By the action of Karma as a pre-existing cause' is to be understood. 196:1 Bhind' etam anto-dosa-sallam; break and take away the dart of the guilt (dosa) of that doubt which has arisen in my inmost being (satana),' says Hînati-kumburê. It is literally 'break this dart of guilt within.' The meaning is clear enough (except as to whether the guilt is the speaker's or 'this people's'). To break a dart in a wound would be no kindness, and that cannot have been the author's idea. To bring out the meaning one must amplify a little, and I should have followed the Simhalese had it not seemed preferable to leave the personality of the guilty one as ambiguous in the translation as in the text. 196:2 Hînati-kumburê, p. 467, does actually put these words into Nâgasena's mouth. 196:3 Sîtalato, literally 'by cold.' See the note above on III, 6, 6 (I, 119). 197:1 Râga, dosa, moha. 197:2 Compare above, IV, 8, 69, and the note there. 197:3 The words in brackets are added from the Simhalese, p. 467. 198:1 So also at Gâtaka IV, 222 (verse 48). 198:2 Samkhârânam parattam sammasati. Compare Dhammapada, verse 374. 198:3 Gayhûpagam; so the Simhalese. 199:1 Divasa-santatta. So Hînati-kumburê, and compare Magghima Nikâya I, 4 5 3, and Gâtaka IV, 118 (where the reading is diva-santatta). See also above, p. 46 of the Pâli. 199:2 For dâho okkamati, Hînati-kumburê may have had a different reading. He renders dahadiya selawenneya, 'sweat shapes' (sic for forms').

199:2 For dâho okkamati, Hînati-kumburê may have had a different reading. He renders dahadiya selawenneya, 'sweat shapes' (sic for forms'). 199:3 Bhavesu; literally 'of becomings' ('in any of the three worlds,' adds the Simhalese). 200:1 Pavatte. I have included Hînati-kumburê's explanation of this word, for which there is no equivalent in English. 200:2 Samkhâra, samkhâra-dharmayangê says the Simhalese. 200:3 Upadhi; the Simhalese (p. 470) has simply klesayan. 200:4 Pahamsîyati kuhûyati, both words only found here. 201:1 Appavattam okkamati, Aprawrittiya yayi kiyana lada Arhat-phalayata pœminenneya, says Hînati-kumburê. 201:2 This paragraph is an excellent example of the difficulty of doing anything like justice in translations to the most instructive and valuable passages in our Buddhist texts. It is in the Pâli full of eloquence, and even in the Simhalese, though there too much expanded, it is powerful and striking. To a Buddhist it must have been inspiring and touching to the last degree, carefully led up to, as it is, with masterly skill, by our author. But it is so full of terms untranslateable into English, and with difficulty even comprehensible to minds saturated with Western ideas, that every translation must be inadequate, and any attempt to reproduce the real beauty of its style must be a failure. 201:3 How almost impossible it is for a reader with pre-conceived delusions to grasp the plain sense of such passages may be seen from the strange note which the French translator has added at the end of this clear and eloquent description. He says, 'La conclusion de ce Jâtaka (sic!) paraît être que le dévot bouddhiste peut p. 202 atteindre Nirvâna dans cette vie même. Il est fâcheux que l'auteur ne se soit pas expliqué plus catégoriquement sur cette question intéressante' (!).

202:1 Sannihitam perhaps 'is situate.' Hînati-kumburê has pihitiye, 'can be got.' 202:2 Ikkhitabbo. See above, p. 269 of the Pâli. 203:1 This is stated in regard to each of the seven in the standard passage on these seven treasures, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 251-259. 203:2 Sakâ. Hînati-kumburê has sadly blundered over this, to him, strange word. He actually translates it 'one's own.' 204:1 Vilâta, the Simhalese has Milâta. 204:2 That is Alexandria on the Indus. See the Introduction to the first part, p. xxiii. 204:3 All these names are discussed, ibid. pp. xliii, xliv. 204:4 Naga-muddham. Hînati-kumburê understands this as the top of Mount Meru, Sakka's heaven. 204:5 Brahma-loke. 205:1 In the Simhalese, pp. 472, 473, this last paragraph is much expanded. 205:2 The Simhalese has Sakala-gana-mano-nandanîyawû me Srî-saddharmâdâsayehi ataweni wargaya nimiyeya.