Book IV. The Solving of Dilemmas: Chapter 8

'No, Sir, it could not.' p. 171 'But wherein, O king, would the second sound differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'By the touching which intervened, Sir, that sound was suppressed 1.' [307] 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 47. 'Or again, O king, it is like the corn seed which had sprung up well in the field, and by means of a plentiful downpour of rain had become well laden far and wide 2 with many seeds, and had survived in safety to the time of standing crops, that corn would be said to have reached, without let or hindrance, to its due season. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have reached death, without let or hindrance, in the fullness of time. But if that corn, after it had sprung up well in the field, should, deprived of water, die, could it be said to have reached its due season?' p. 172

p. 172 'No, Sir, it could not.' 'But wherein, O king, would the second crop differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'Oppressed by the heat which intervened, that crop, Sir, perished.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 48. 'And have you ever heard, O king, of a young crop that, after it had come to ear, worms sprung up and destroyed down to the roots?' 'We have both heard of such a thing, Sir, and have seen it, too.' 'Well, O king, was that crop destroyed in season, or out of season?' 'Out of season, Sir. For surely if worms had not destroyed the crop it would have survived to harvest time.' 'What then, O king! on a disaster intervening the crop is lost, but if no injury is done it, it survives to the harvest?' 'That is so, Sir.' [308] 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in

[308] 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in p. 173 temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 49. 'And have you ever heard, O king, of a crop that had grown, and was bent down by the weight of the grains of corn, the ears having duly formed 1, when a so-called Karaka rain (hail-storm) 2 falling on it, destroyed it?' 'We have both heard of such a thing, Sir, and have seen it, too.' 'Well, O king! would you say the crop was destroyed in season or out of season?' 'Out of season, Sir. For if the hail-storm had not come the crop would have lasted to harvest time.' 'What then, O king! on a disaster intervening the crop is lost, but if no injury is done it, it survives to the harvest?' 'That is so, Sir.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O

p. 174 king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time.' 50. 'Most wonderful, Nâgasena, most strange! Right well have you explained, by reason and by simile, how it is that people die before their time. That there is such a thing as premature death have you made clear and plain and evident 1. A thoughtless man even, Nâgasena, a puzzle-headed fellow, could by any one of your comparisons have come to the conclusion that premature deaths do occur;--[309] how much more an able man! I was convinced already, Sir, by the first of your similes, that such deaths happen, but nevertheless, out of the wish to hear still further and further solutions, I would not give in.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to premature deaths.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH. WONDERS AT THE GRAVE.] 51. 'Venerable Nâgasena, are there wonders at the Ketiyas (the mounds raised over the ashes) of all who have passed entirely away (of all the Arahats deceased) 2? 'Of some, O king, but not of others.' 'But of which, Sir, is this the case, and of which not?' p. 175 'It is by the stedfast resolve, O king, of three kinds of people, that wonders take place at the Ketiya of some person deceased who has been entirely set free. And who are the three? In the first place, O king, an Arahat, when still alive, may, out of pity for gods and men, make the resolve: "Let there be such and such wonders at my Ketiya 1." Then, by reason of his resolve, wonders happen there. Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of an Arahat at the Ketiya of one entirely set free.

'And again, O king, the gods, out of pity for men, show wonders at the Ketiya of one who has been entirely set free, thinking: "By this wonder may the true faith remain always established on the earth, and may mankind, believing, grow in grace!" Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of a god at the Ketiya of one entirely set free. 'And again, O king, some woman or some man of believing heart, able, intelligent, wise, endowed with insight, may deliberately take perfumes, or a garland, or a cloth, and place it on the Ketiya, making the resolve: "May such and such a wonder take place!" Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of human beings at the Ketiya of one entirely set free. 52. 'These, O king, are the three kinds of people by whose stedfast resolve wonders take place at the Ketiyas of Arahats deceased. And if there has been no such resolve, O king, by one of these, then p. 176 is there no wonder at the Ketiya even of one whose Âsavas had been destroyed, who had attained to the sixfold insight, who was master of himself. And if there be no such wonder, then, O king, [310] one should call to mind the purity of conduct one has seen 1, and draw in trusting faith the conclusion: "Verily, this child of the Buddhas has been entirely set free!"' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to wonders at the grave.]

[Here ends the dilemma as to wonders at the grave.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH. CONVERSION AND CONDUCT.] 53. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those who regulate their lives aright--do they all attain to insight into the Truth, or are there some of them who do not?' 'Some do, O king, and some do not.' 'Then which do, Sir, and which do not?' 'He who is born as an animal, O king, even though he regulate his life aright, will not attain to insight into the Truth, nor he who is born in p. 177 the Preta world, nor he who holds wrong views, nor the deceitful man, nor he who has slain his mother, or his father, or an Arahat, nor he who has raised up a schism in the Order, nor he who has shed a Buddha's blood, nor he who has furtively attached himself to the Order 1, nor he who has become a pervert 2, nor he who has violated a sister of the Order, nor he who, having been guilty of one or other of the thirteen grievous offences 3, has not been rehabilitated, nor a eunuch, nor an hermaphrodite--and whosoever is a human child under seven years of age, even though he regulate his life aright, will not attain to insight into the Truth. To these sixteen individuals there is no attainment of insight, O king, even though they regulate their life aright.' 54. 'Venerable Nâgasena, there may or may not be a possibility of insight to the fifteen you have first singled out for opposition 4. But what is the reason why an infant, one under seven years of age, should not, even though he regulate his life aright, attain to insight? Therein there is still a puzzle left. For is it not admitted that in a child there is not passion, neither malice, nor dullness, nor pride, nor heresy, nor discontent, nor lustful thoughts? Being undefiled by sin, that which we call an infant is fit and ready (to the attainment

p. 178 even of Arahatship--how much more) 1 is he worthy to penetrate at a glance into the four truths!' 'The following is the reason, O king, for my saying [311] that an infant, even though he regulate his life aright, cannot attain to insight. If, O king, one under seven years of age could feel passion about things exciting to passion, could go wrong in things leading to iniquity, could be befooled in matters that mislead, could be maddened as to things that infatuate, could understand a heresy, could distinguish between content and discontent, could think out virtue and vice, then might insight be possible to him. But the mind of one under seven years of age, O king, is powerless and weak, mean, small, slight, obscure, and dull, whereas the essential principle of Nirvâna is transcendental, important, weighty, wide-reaching, and extensive. Therefore is it, O king, that the infant, with so imperfect a mind, is unable to grasp an idea so great. It is like the case of Sineru, O king, the king of the mountains, heavy and ponderous, wide-reaching and mighty as it is,--could now a man, by his ordinary strength and power and energy, root that mountain up 2?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not?' 'Because of the weakness of the man, and because of the mightiness of Sineru, the mountain king.' p. 179 'Just so, O king, is the relation of the infant's mind to Nirvâna 1.' 55. 'And again, it is like the broad earth, O king, long and wide, great in expanse and extension, large and mighty--would now a tiny drop of water be able to wet and turn to mud that broad earth 2?'

55. 'And again, it is like the broad earth, O king, long and wide, great in expanse and extension, large and mighty--would now a tiny drop of water be able to wet and turn to mud that broad earth 2?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not, O king?' 'Because of the minuteness of the drop of water, and because of the greatness of the broad earth.' 'Just so, O king, is the relation of the infant's mind to Nirvâna. [312] 56. 'Or again, O king, suppose there were weak and powerless, minute, tiny, limited, and dull fire--would it be possible, with so insignificant a fire, to overcome darkness and make light appear over the whole world of gods and men?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not, O king?' 'Because of the dullness of the fire, and because of the greatness of the world.' 'Just so, O king, the mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull; it is veiled, moreover, with the thick darkness of ignorance. Hard would it be, therefore, for it to shine forth with the light of knowledge. And that is the reason, O king, why to an infant, to one under seven years of age, even though he order his conduct aright, there can be no attainment of insight into the Truth. p. 180 57. 'Or again, O king, suppose there were a Sâlaka 1, minute in the measure of its body, and rendered lean by disease, and it on seeing an elephant king, which showed the signs of rut in three places, and was nine cubits in length, and three in breadth, and ten in girth, and seven in height 2, coming to its lair, were to begin to drag the elephant towards it with the view of swallowing it--now would the Sâlaka, O king, be able to do 3?'

'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not, O king?' 'Because of the minuteness of the Sâlaka's body, and because of the magnitude of the elephant king.' 'Just so, O king, the mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull. Grand and transcendental is the ambrosial essence of Nirvâna 4. With that mind so powerless and weak, so limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull, he cannot penetrate into the grand and transcendental essence of Nirvâna. p. 181 And that is the reason, O king, why to an infant, one under seven years of age, even though he order his conduct aright, there can be no attainment to insight of the Truth.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma on conversion and conduct.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-NINTH. THE PAIN OF NIRVÂNA 1.] [313] 58. 'Venerable Nâgasena, how is it? Is Nirvâna all bliss, or is it partly pain. 2? p. 182 'Nirvâna is all bliss, O king. There is no intermingling of pain in it.' 'That, Sir, is a saying we cannot believe--that Nirvâna is all bliss. On this point, Nâgasena, we maintain that Nirvâna must be alloyed with pain. And there is a reason for our adopting that view. What is that reason? Those, Nâgasena, who seek after Nirvâna are seen to practise exertion and application both of body and of mind, restraint in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and eating, suppression of sleep, subjugation of the organs of sense, renunciation of wealth and corn, of dear relatives and friends. But all those who are joyful and happy in the world take delight in, are devoted to, the five pleasures of sense--they practise and delight their eyes in many kinds of pleasurable forms, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their ears in many kinds of pleasurable sounds of revelry and song, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their sense of smell with many kinds of perfumes of flowers, and fruits, and leaves, and bark, and roots, and sap, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their tongue with many kinds of pleasurable tastes of hard foods and of soft, of syrups, drinks, and beverages, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their sense of touch with many kinds of pleasurable feelings, tender and delicate, exquisite and soft, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their minds with many sorts of conceptions and ideas, pure and impure, good and bad, such as at any time they like the best. You, on the other hand, put a stop to and destroy,

p. 183 maim and mangle, put a drag on and restrain the development of your eye, and ear, and nose, and tongue, and body, and mind. Therefore is your body afflicted and your mind afflicted too, and your body being afflicted you feel bodily discomfort and pain, and your minds being afflicted you feel mental discomfort too and pain. Did not even Mâgandiya, the ascetic, find fault with the Blessed One, and say 1: [314] "The Samana Gotama is a destroyer of increase 2?"' 59. 'Nirvâna, O king, has no pain in it. It is bliss unalloyed. When you, O king, maintain that Nirvâna is painful, that which you call "painful" is not Nirvâna. It is the preliminary stage to the realisation of Nirvâna, it is the process of seeking after Nirvâna. Nirvâna itself is bliss pure and simple, there is no pain mixed with it. And I will give you an explanation of this. Is there such a thing, O king, as the bliss of sovranty which kings enjoy?' 'Most certainly.' 'And is there no pain, O king, mingled with that bliss?' 'No, Sir.' 'But surely then, O king, why is it that when their frontier provinces have broken out in revolt, the kings, to the end that they may bring the inhabitants of those provinces into subjection again, leave their homes, attended by their ministers and chiefs, their p. 184 soldiers and their guards, and marching over ground even and uneven, tormented the while by gnats and mosquitoes and hot winds, engage in fierce fights, and suffer the presentiment of death?'

soldiers and their guards, and marching over ground even and uneven, tormented the while by gnats and mosquitoes and hot winds, engage in fierce fights, and suffer the presentiment of death?' 'That, venerable Nâgasena, is not what is called the bliss of sovranty. It is only the preliminary stage in the pursuit of that bliss. It is after they have thus, in pain, sought after sovranty, that they enjoy the bliss thereof. And thus that bliss, Nâgasena, is itself unmixed with pain, for the bliss of sovranty is one thing, and the pain another.' 'Just so, O king, is Nirvâna all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. Those who are in quest of Nirvâna afflict their minds and bodies it is true, restrain themselves in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and in food, suppress their sleep, keep their senses in subjection, abandon their very body and their life. But it is after they have thus, in pain, sought after Nirvâna, that they enjoy the Nirvâna which is bliss unalloyed--as kings do the bliss of sovranty after their foes have been put down. Thus is it, O king, that Nirvâna is all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. For Nirvâna is one thing, and the pain another. [315] 60. 'And hear another explanation, O king, of the same thing. Is there such a thing, O king, as the bliss of knowledge which those teachers have who have passed through their course?' 'Yes, Sir, there is.' 'Well, is that bliss of knowledge alloyed with pain?'

'Well, is that bliss of knowledge alloyed with pain?' 'No.' 'What then, O king, is the good of their afflicting p. 185 themselves by bowing down before and standing up in the presence of their teachers; by drawing water, and sweeping out the cell, and placing tooth-sticks and washing-water ready; by living upon scraps left over; by doing service in shampooing, and bathing, and washing of the feet; by suppressing their own will, and acting according to the will of others; by sleeping in discomfort, and feeding on distasteful food?' 'That, Nâgasena, is not the bliss of knowledge, it is a preliminary stage in the pursuit thereof. It is after the teachers have, in pain, sought after knowledge, that they enjoy its bliss. Thus is it, Nâgasena, that the bliss of knowledge is unalloyed with pain. For that bliss of knowledge is one thing, and the pain another.' 'Just so, O king, is Nirvâna all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. Those who are in quest of Nirvâna afflict their minds and bodies it is true, restrain themselves in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and in food, suppress their sleep, keep their senses in subjection, abandon their very body and their life. But it is after they have thus, in pain, sought after Nirvâna, that they enjoy the Nirvâna which is bliss unalloyed--as teachers do the bliss of knowledge. Thus is it, O king, that Nirvâna is all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. For Nirvâna is one thing, and the pain another.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the pain of Nirvâna.] p. 186 [DILEMMA THE EIGHTIETH. THE OUTWARD FORM OF NIRVÂNA.] 61. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this Nirvâna that you are always talking of--can you make clear by metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument, the form, or figure, or duration 1, or measure of it?' [316] 'Nirvâna, O king, has nothing similar to it. By no metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument can its form, or figure, or duration, or measure be made clear.' 'That I cannot believe, Nâgasena,--that of Nirvâna, which really after all is a condition that exists 2, it should be so impossible in any way to make us understand either the form, or figure, or duration, or measure! Give me some explanation of this.' 62. 'Very well, O king, I will do so. Is there such a thing, O king, as the great ocean?' 'Yes, the ocean exists.' 'Well, suppose some one were to ask you, saying: "How much water is there, your majesty, in the sea, and how many are the creatures that dwell therein?" When that question had been put, how would you answer him?' 'I should reply thus to such a question: "My good fellow! this is an unaskable thing that you ask me. No one ought to ask such a question. It p. 187 is a point that should be left alone. The physicists 1 have never examined into the ocean in that way. And no one can measure the water there, or count the creatures who dwell therein." Thus, Sir, should I make reply.'

is a point that should be left alone. The physicists 1 have never examined into the ocean in that way. And no one can measure the water there, or count the creatures who dwell therein." Thus, Sir, should I make reply.' 63. 'But why, O king, would you make such a reply about the ocean which, after all, is really an existing condition of things 2. Ought you not rather to count and tell him, saying: "So and so much is the water in the sea, and so and so many are the creatures that dwell therein?"' 'That would be impossible, Sir. The question is beyond one's power.' 'As impossible as it is, O king, to tell the measure of the water in the sea, or the number of the creatures dwelling therein, though after all the sea exists, so impossible is it in any of the ways you suggest to tell the form, or figure, or duration, or measure of Nirvâna, though after all it is a condition that does exist. [317] And even, O king, if one of magical powers, master over mind, were to be able to count the water and the creatures in the sea, even he could not tell the form or the figure, the duration or the measure of Nirvâna. 64. 'And hear another explanation of the same thing, O king. Are there, O king, among the gods certain of them called "The Formless Ones 3? p. 188 'Yes, Sir. I have heard there are such.' 'Well, O king, can you make clear by metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument the form, or figure, or duration 1, or size of these gods, the "Formless Ones?"'

'Well, O king, can you make clear by metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument the form, or figure, or duration 1, or size of these gods, the "Formless Ones?"' 'No, I cannot.' 'Then, O king, there are none.' 'The Formless Ones, Sir, do exist; and yet it is impossible in any of the ways you suggest to explain either their form or figure, either their duration or their size.' 'As impossible as it is, O king, to tell the form or figure, the duration or the size of the gods called "Formless Ones," though they after all are beings that exist 2, so impossible is it in any of the ways you suggest to explain the form or the figure, the duration or the measure of Nirvâna, though after all it is a condition that does exist.' 65. 'Venerable Nâgasena, I will grant you that Nirvâna is bliss unalloyed, and yet that is impossible to make clear, either by simile or explanation, by reason or by argument, either its form or its figure, either its duration or its size. But is there no quality of Nirvâna which is inherent also in other p. 189 things 1, and is such that it can be made evident by metaphor 2?' 'Though there is nothing as to its form which can be so explained, there is something, O king, as to its qualities which can.' [318] 'O happy word, Nâgasena! Speak then, quickly, that I may have an explanation of even one point in the characteristics of Nirvâna. Appease the fever of my heart. Allay it by the cool sweet breezes of your words!'

[318] 'O happy word, Nâgasena! Speak then, quickly, that I may have an explanation of even one point in the characteristics of Nirvâna. Appease the fever of my heart. Allay it by the cool sweet breezes of your words!' 'There is one quality of the lotus, O king, inherent in Nirvâna, and two qualities of water, and three of medicine, and four of the ocean, and five of food, and ten of space, and three of the wish-conferring gem, and three of red sandal wood, and three of the froth of ghee, and five of a mountain peak.' 66. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the lotus which you said was inherent in Nirvâna,--which is that?' 'As the lotus, O king, is untarnished by the water 3, so is Nirvâna untarnished by any evil dispositions. This is the one quality of the lotus inherent in Nirvâna.' p. 190 67. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of water which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As water, O king, is cool and assuages heat, so also is Nirvâna cool, and assuages the fever arising from all evil dispositions. This is the first quality of water inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as water allays the thirst of men and beasts when they are exhausted and anxious, craving for drink, and tormented by thirst, so does Nirvâna allay the thirst of the craving after lusts, the craving after future life, and the craving after worldly prosperity 1. This is the second quality of water inherent in Nirvâna.'

68. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of medicine, which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' [319] 'As medicine, O king, is the refuge of beings tormented by poison, so is Nirvâna the refuge of beings tormented with the poison of evil dispositions. This is the first quality of medicine inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as medicine puts an end to diseases, so does Nirvâna put an end to griefs. This is the second quality of medicine inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as medicine is ambrosia 2, so also is Nirvâna ambrosia. This is the third quality of medicine inherent in Nirvâna.' p. 191 69. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those four qualities of the ocean which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As the ocean, O king, is free from (empty of) corpses 1, so also is Nirvâna free from (empty of) the dead bodies of all evil dispositions 2. This, O king, is the first quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is mighty and boundless, and fills not with all the rivers that flow in to it; so is Nirvâna mighty and boundless, and fills not with all beings (who enter in to it). This is the second quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is the abode of mighty creatures, so is Nirvâna the abode of great men--Arahats, in whom the Great Evils and all stains have been destroyed, endowed with power, masters of themselves. This is the third quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is all in blossom 3, as it were, with the innumerable and various and fine flowers of the ripple of its waves, so is Nirvâna all in blossom, as it were, with the innumerable and

p. 192 various and fine flowers of purity, of knowledge, and of emancipation. This is the fourth quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna.' [320] 70. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of food which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As food, O king, is the support of the life of all beings, so is Nirvâna, when it has been realised, the support of life, for it puts an end to old age and death. This is the first quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food increases the strength of all beings, so does Nirvâna, when it has been realised, increase the power of Iddhi of all beings. This is the second quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food is the source of the beauty of all beings, so is Nirvâna, when it has been realised, the source to all beings of the beauty of holiness. This is the third quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food puts a stop to suffering in all beings, so does Nirvâna, when it has been realised, put a stop in all beings to the suffering arising from every evil disposition. This is the fourth quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food overcomes in all beings the weakness of hunger, so does Nirvâna, when it has been realised, overcome in all beings the weakness which arises from hunger and every sort of pain. This is the fifth quality of food inherent in Nirvâna.'

71. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those ten qualities of space which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As space, O king, neither is born nor grows old, neither dies nor passes away nor is reborn (has p. 193 a future life to spring up into), as it is incompressible, cannot be carried off by thieves, rests on nothing, is the sphere in which birds fly, is unobstructed, and is infinite; [321] so, O king, Nirvâna is not born, neither does it grow old, it dies not, it passes not away, it has no rebirth (no future life to spring up into), it is unconquerable, thieves carry it not off, it is not attached to anything 1, it is the sphere in which Arahats move, nothing can obstruct it, and it is infinite. These are the ten qualities of space inherent in Nirvâna.' 72. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the wish-conferring gem which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As the wishing-gem, O king, satisfies every desire, so also does Nirvâna. This is the first quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the wishing-gem causes delight, so also does Nirvâna. This is the second quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the wishing-gem is full of lustre, so also is Nirvâna. This is the third quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna.' 73. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of red sandal wood which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?'

73. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of red sandal wood which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' p. 194 'As red sandal wood, O king, is hard to get, so is Nirvâna hard to attain to. This is the first quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as red sandal wood is unequalled in the beauty of its perfume, so is Nirvâna. This is the second quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as red sandal wood is praised by all the good, so is Nirvâna praised by all the Noble Ones. This is the third quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna.' 74. [322] 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the skimmings of ghee 1 which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As ghee is beautiful in colour, O king, so also is Nirvâna beautiful in righteousness. This is the first quality of the ghee inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as ghee has a pleasant perfume, so also has Nirvâna the pleasant perfume of righteousness. This is the second quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as ghee has a pleasant taste, so also has Nirvâna. This is the third quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâna.' 75. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of a mountain peak which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As a mountain peak is very lofty, so also is Nirvâna very exalted. This is the first quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is immoveable, so also is Nirvâna. This is the second quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king,

'As a mountain peak is very lofty, so also is Nirvâna very exalted. This is the first quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is immoveable, so also is Nirvâna. This is the second quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, p. 195 as a mountain peak is inaccessible, so also is Nirvâna inaccessible to all evil dispositions. This is the third quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is a place where no plants can grow, so also is Nirvâna a condition in which no evil dispositions can grow. This is the fourth quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is free alike from desire to please and from resentment, so also is Nirvâna. This is the fifth quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna.' [323] 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to the form of Nirvâna.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE EIGHTY-FIRST. THE TIME OF NIRVANA.] 76. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say 1: "Nirvâna is not past, nor future, nor present, nor produced, nor not produced, nor producible 2." 'In that case, Nâgasena, does the man who, having ordered his life aright, realises Nirvâna, realise something already produced, or does he himself produce it first, and then realise it?'

'In that case, Nâgasena, does the man who, having ordered his life aright, realises Nirvâna, realise something already produced, or does he himself produce it first, and then realise it?' 'Neither the one, O king, nor the other. And nevertheless, O king, that principle of Nirvâna (nibbâna-dhâtu) which he, so ordering his life aright, realises--that exists.' p. 196 'Do not, venerable Nâgasena, clear up this puzzle by making it dark! Make it open and plain as you elucidate it. With a will, strenuous in endeavour, pour out upon it all that has been taught you. It is a point on which this people is bewildered, plunged into perplexity, lost in doubt. Dissipate this guilty uncertainty; it pierces like a dart 1!' 77. 'That principle of Nirvâna, O king, so peaceful, so blissful, so delicate, exists. And it is that which he who orders his life aright, grasping the idea of all things (of the Confections, Samkhâras) according to the teachings of the Conquerors, realises by his wisdom--even as a pupil, by his knowledge, makes himself, according to the instruction of his teacher, master of an art. 'And if you ask: "How is Nirvâna to be known 2?" it is by freedom from distress and danger, by confidence, by peace, by calm, by bliss, by happiness, by delicacy, by purity, by freshness 3. 78. 'Just, O king, as a man being burnt in a blazing fiery furnace heaped up with many faggots of dry sticks, when he has freed himself from it by

78. 'Just, O king, as a man being burnt in a blazing fiery furnace heaped up with many faggots of dry sticks, when he has freed himself from it by p. 197 a violent effort, and escaped into a cool place, [324] would experience supreme bliss--just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, in which the burning heat of the threefold fire (of lust, malice, and delusion) 1 has all gone out. As the furnace, O king, so should you regard this threefold fire, as the man fallen into the fire the man who is ordering his life aright, as the cool place Nirvâna. 79. 'Or again, O king, as a man fallen into a pit full of the dead bodies of snakes and dogs and men, of ordure, and of refuse, when, finding himself in the midst of it entangled in the hair of the corpses, he had by a violent effort escaped into a place where no dead bodies were, would experience supreme bliss--just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, from which the corpses of all evil dispositions have been removed 2. As a corpse, O king, so should you regard the four pleasures of sense, as the man fallen among corpses the man who is ordering his life aright, as the place free from corpses Nirvâna. 80. 'Or again, O king, as a man (fallen among enemies with drawn swords in their hands) 3, quaking with fear and terror, agitated and upset in mind, when with a violent effort he has freed himself from them, and escaped into a strong refuge, a firm place of security, experiences supreme bliss--just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna,

p. 198 in which fear and terror have been put away. As the terror, O king, so should you regard the anxiety which arises again and again on account of birth, old age, disease, and death, as the terrified man the man who is ordering his life aright, as the place of refuge Nirvâna. 81. 'Or again, O king, as a man fallen on a spot filthy with dirt, and slime, and mud, when with a violent effort he has got rid of the mud, and escaped to a clean and spotless place, would experience supreme bliss-just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, from which the stains and mud of evil dispositions have been removed. As the mud, O king, [325] so should you regard income, and honour, and praise 1, as the man fallen into the mud the man who is ordering his life aright, as the clean and spotless place Nirvâna. 82. 'And if again you should ask: "How does he who orders his life aright realise that Nirvâna?" (I should reply), He, O king, who orders his life aright grasps the truth as to the development of all things 2, and when he is doing so he perceives therein birth, he perceives old age, he perceives disease, he perceives death. But he perceives not therein either happiness or bliss, he perceives not therein, whether in the beginning, or the middle, or the end, anything worthy of being laid hold of (as lasting satisfaction) 3. As a man, O king, if a mass of iron

p. 199 had been heated the livelong day 1, and were all glowing, scorching, and red hot, would find no spot on it, whether at one end or in the middle or at the other end, fit to be taken hold of--just so, O king, he who orders his life aright grasps the truth of the development of things, and in doing so he perceives therein birth, he perceives old age, he perceives disease, he perceives death. But he perceives not therein either happiness or bliss, he perceives not therein, whether in the beginning, or in the middle, or in the end, anything fit to be taken hold of (as a lasting satisfaction). 83. 'And discontent arises in his mind when he thus finds nothing fit to be relied on as a lasting satisfaction, and a fever takes possession of his body 2, and without a refuge or protection, hopeless, he becomes weary of repeated lives 3. As if a man had fallen into a burning and blazing mighty fiery furnace, and saw no refuge from it, no way of escape, he would, hopeless, be weary of the fire--just so, O king, discontent arises in his mind when he thus finds nothing fit to be relied on as a lasting satisfaction, and a fever takes possession of his body, and without a refuge or protection, hopeless, he becomes weary of repeated births. 84. 'And in the mind of him who thus perceives p. 200 the insecurity of transitory life, (of starting afresh ha innumerable births) 1 the thought arises: "All on fire is this endless becoming, burning, and blazing! Full of pain is it, of despair! If only one could reach a state in which there were no becoming, there would there be calm, that would be sweet-the cessation of all these conditions 2, the getting rid of all these defects 3 (of lusts, of evil, and of Karma), the end of cravings, the absence of passion, peace, Nirvâna!" And therewith does his mind leap forward into that state in which there is no becoming, and then has he found peace, [326] then does he exult and rejoice 4 at the thought: "A refuge have I gained at last!" Just, O king, as a man who, venturing into a strange land, has lost his way, on becoming aware of a path, free from jungle, that will lead him home, bounds forward along it, contented in mind, exulting and rejoicing at the thought: "I have found the way at last!"--just so in him who thus perceives the insecurity of transitory births there arises the thought: "All on fire is this endless becoming, burning, and blazing! Full of pain is it, and despair! If only one could reach a state in which there were no becoming, there would there be calm, that would be sweet-the cessation of all these conditions, the getting rid of all these defects, the end of cravings, the absence of passion, peace, Nirvâna!" And therewith does his mind leap forward into that state in which there is no becoming,

p. 201 and then has he found peace, then does he exult and rejoice at the thought: "A refuge have I found at last!" And he strives with might and main along that path, searches it out, accustoms himself thoroughly to it, to that end does he make firm his self-possession, to that end does he hold fast in effort, to that end does he remain stedfast in love (toward all beings in all the worlds), and still to that does he direct his mind again and again, until gone far beyond the transitory, he gains the Real, the highest fruit (of Arahatship) 1. And when he has gained that, O king, the man who has ordered his life aright has realised, (seen face to face,) Nirvâna 2!' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to the time of Nirvâna 3.] p. 202 [DILEMMA THE EIGHTY-SECOND. THE PLACE OF NIRVANA.] 85. 'Venerable Nâgasena, does there exist the spot--either in the direction of the East, or of the South, or of the West, or of the North, either above, or below, or on the horizon-where Nirvâna is stored up 1?' 'There is no spot, O king,--either in the East, or the South, or in the West, or the North, either above, or below, or on the horizon--where Nirvâna is.' 'But if so, Nâgasena, then neither can Nirvâna exist, and those who realise it, their realisation is vain. And I will give you an explanation of this. Just, Sir, as there are on the earth fields in which crops can be grown, flowers from which perfumes come, bushes on which flowers can grow, trees on which fruits can ripen, mines from which gems can be dug, so that whosoever desires any of these things can go there and get it--just so, Nâgasena, if [327] Nirvâna exists one must expect there to be some place, where it is produced 2. But since there is not, therefore I declare that there can be no Nirvâna, and those who realise it, their realisation is vain.'

86. 'There is no spot, O king, where Nirvâna is p. 203 situate, and yet Nirvâna is, and he who orders his life right will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna. Just as fire exists, and yet there is no place where fire (by itself) is stored up. But if a man rubs two sticks together the fire comes;--just so, O king, Nirvâna exists, though there is no spot where it is stored up. And he who orders his life aright will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna. 87. 'Or again, O king, just as there are the seven treasures of the king of kings--the treasure of the wheel, and the treasure of the elephant, and the treasure of the horse, and the treasure of the gem, and the treasure of the woman, and the treasure of the finance minister, and the treasure of the adviser. But there is no spot where these treasures are laid up. When a sovran conducts himself aright they appear to him of their own accord 1--just so, O king, Nirvâna, exists, though there is no place where it is stored up. And he who orders his life aright will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna.' 88. 'Venerable Nâgasena, let it be granted that there is no place where Nirvâna, is stored up. But is there any place on which a man may stand and, ordering his life aright, realise Nirvâna?' 'Yes, O king, there is such a place.' 'Which then, Nâgasena, is that place 'Virtue, O king, is the place. For if grounded in virtue, and careful in attention--whether in the land of the Scythians 2 or the Greeks, whether in China or

'Virtue, O king, is the place. For if grounded in virtue, and careful in attention--whether in the land of the Scythians 2 or the Greeks, whether in China or p. 204 [paragraph continues] Tartary 1, whether in Alexandria 2 or in Nikumba, whether in Benares or in Kosala, whether in Kashmir or in Gandhâra 3, whether on a mountain top 4 or in the highest heavens 5--wheresoever he may be, the man who orders his life aright will realise Nirvâna. [328] Just, O king, as the man who has eyes wherever he may be--in the land of the Scythians or the Greeks, in China or in Tartary, in Alexandria, Nikumba, Benares, or Kosala, in Kashmir or in Gandhâra, on a mountain top or in the highest heavens--will be able to behold the expanse of heaven and to see the horizon facing him--just so, O king, will he who orders his conduct aright and is careful in attention--whether in the land of the Scythians or the Greeks, whether in China or Tartary, whether in Alexandria, or Benares, or Kosala, or Nikumba, whether in Kashmir or in Gandhâra, whether on a mountain top or in the highest heavens--wheresoever he may be, attain to the realisation of Nirvâna.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! You have preached to me of Nirvâna, and of the realisation thereof, you have set forth the advantages of virtue, you have explained the supreme attainment, you have raised aloft the standard of the Truth, you have established the eye of Truth, you have shown how right means adopted by those of high aims will be neither

'Very good, Nâgasena! You have preached to me of Nirvâna, and of the realisation thereof, you have set forth the advantages of virtue, you have explained the supreme attainment, you have raised aloft the standard of the Truth, you have established the eye of Truth, you have shown how right means adopted by those of high aims will be neither p. 205 barren nor unfruitful. That is so, and I accept it as you say 1.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem of the place of Nirvâna.] ____________________________ [Here ends the Eighth Chapter 2.] 114:1 We have seen above, IV, 1, 41 (1, 178), how Hînati-kumburê expanded the story of Vessantara, which had aroused also in our author a greater enthusiasm than any of the many other subjects that he treats. Here too the Simhalese translator fairly runs riot over the 'mighty giving of the glorious king,' and expands the ten pages of the Pâli into thirty-three pages of his version (pp. 389-421), whereas usually one page of the Simhalese covers very nearly a page of the Pâli. 114:2 Anumaggiyante. See Mr. Trenckner's note. But the p. 115 Simhalese (p. 390) has at mardanaya kota welannawun dœka. 115:1 Rûlarûlassa bhîmabhîmassa. The Simhalese (p. 390) omits these words, giving other details in place of them, and as they occur only here I am not sure of their meaning. 116:1 Vikittentâ vikopentâ. Hînati-kumburê (p. 410) has 'angrily finding fault with.' Compare above, vikopanâ, at p. 266 (of the Pâli).

116:1 Vikittentâ vikopentâ. Hînati-kumburê (p. 410) has 'angrily finding fault with.' Compare above, vikopanâ, at p. 266 (of the Pâli). 117:1 Pakkha-hato vâ pîtha-sappî vâ. See the note above on IV, 6, 22. 117:2 Devayâna, on which compare Sutta Nipâta, verse 139 (Vasala Sutta 24). 119:1 Atisañkârena, which the Simhalese merely repeats. The meaning is doubtful. The use of sañkâra at Gâtaka II, 112 has suggested the above rendering. 119:2 The whole of this answer turns on the ambiguity of the prefix ati, which may mean either 'very much' or 'too much.' 119:3 'Yâdisam kîdisam. The meaning of this idiom cannot be controlled by parallel passages, as I know of none. Hînati-kumburê (pp. 412-413) construes yâdisam as an accusative dependent on atidânadâyî; 'Those who give away anything as a gift, acquire fame in the world as exceeding givers of that.' 120:1 Dakkhineyya. We have no word in English to express the full meaning of this word. It was an idea that was common ground to our Buddhist apologist, and to the Brahman opponents whom he always has in view, that there were certain people to whom gifts ought to be given, and the being worthy was one of the conditions precedent to belonging to this class. Of course the p. 121 Brahmans held that to be a Brahman was another condition, but the Buddhist, who inherited the idea from them, had discarded this part of the conception. See, for the Brahman view, Eggeling's Satapatha-Brâhmana II, 114, 344.

121:1 Samagga-dânam. Childers under samaggâ gives only the meaning 'assembly,' but it is clear from Kullavagga V, 26; VI, 2, 7; the Sutta Vibhanga II, 267, and Sumangala I, 84, that the word, at least as a masculine (which it is here), has the technical sense of one of those orgies in high places which were common in so many parts of the world in very early times, and were due in India to Kolarian influences. The giving' (dâna) of such a samagga would doubtless mean the providing of the necessary food, seats, cushions, &c. 121:2 Kitta-kammam. See my note on Patibhâna-kittam at 'Vinaya Texts,' III, 172. 122:1 I.e. pieces of money, which it would be against the rules for a member of the Buddhist Order to accept. But the donees in all these cases are not necessarily Buddhists. 122:2 Paripâtesi, not in Childers; but see Gâtaka II, 208; and below, p. 367 (of the Pâli text). Hînati-kumburê has here nindâ karanne, and just below apasâdanaya karanne. 122:3 Âvapitum, not in Childers. Dr. Morris, in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1886, p. 157, compares the Sanskrit root vyap, but this does not help us much. Hînati-kumburê (p. 414) has 'an tœneka œpaye hinduwannata,' which means, I think, 'to deposit as a pledge in some place or other.' At all events œpa, the ordinary word now in use in Ceylon courts for 'bail,' may very well be actually derived from vâpa. And the passage at Gâtaka I, 321 is an exact parallel to our phrase here, for there the Bodisat, when an elephant, gives away his teeth and tusks as vâpana for the insight of the Omniscient Ones.

123:1 Niminitvâ, also not in Childers; but see Gâtaka III, 63, 221. 124:1 Agapatham sankupatham vettapatham gakkhati. Hînati-kumburê, at p. 416, repeats the words with a gloss on the two last words, which I have followed. 124:2 Mudda-kâmo; mudra-nam ganam perekkuwa, says Hînati-kumburê, p. 416. 124:3 Bâhirabbhantaram dhanam datvâ. I am not sure that I have rightly understood this phrase, which the Simhalese merely repeats. 125:1 Kariyâ Pitaka I, 9, 53. 125:2 Dessa, that is dreshya, from dvish. Compare diso, 'an enemy.' It occurs also at Kariyâ Pitaka I, 4, 7; 5, 3; 8, 16 (quoted Gâtaka IV, 406); II, 4, 11; III, 1, 6 (quoted Gâtaka I, 46); III, 2, 16; 3, 10; 6, 18. The effect of the use of this rare poetical word is lost in the English version. 125:3 Maddî and Kanhâginâ, the names of Vessantara's wife and daughter, mean respectively 'enthraller (of men's minds),' and 'the dark conquerors (of hearts).' As Vessantara is used in the Magghima (I, 386, line 5) as an adjective, not a name, and is applied to the Buddha, it too must have a special meaning. But it can scarcely be connected with Vaisya, while we have a very famous epithet in vaisvânara, so often applied to the sacred fire as 'common good to all men.' The insertion of the t would explain the shortening of the â, and though there seems to be no sufficient reason for any alteration at all of the older term, this is p. 126 probably the real derivation of Vessantara. And the whole legend may well be due to previous stories of the world-wide beneficence of Agni Vaisvânara, or of the sun as Vaisvânara.

126:1 Hadaya-vatthu, like a broth-pot foaming over,' is Hînati-kumburê's explanation of this phrase (pena nœgena mas sœliyak men hridaya wastuwa, p. 417). 127:1 Kandima-suriye. We should say 'the sun and the moon,' and I cannot think the difference of phraseology is entirely without significance. While the Brahmans put their own caste and order first, the Buddhist texts talk of 'Samanas and Brahmans,' 'Khattiyas and Brahmans.' This has, and no doubt rightly, been held significant of the opinion of the authors. Why should the fact of their always referring, in similar compounds, to the moon before the sun, and to women before men, be less so? Now it is almost always taken for granted that the Buddhists were reformers, as opposed to the Brahmans, who wanted to run still in the ancient grooves. But there is another side of the question that has been entirely overlooked. There is ample evidence in their literature that (at least in certain directions, more especially of religious thought) the Brahmans had been constantly progressive, and their Brâhmanas are really the result of reform following on reform. To use a parallel drawn from modern politics, Buddhists are to Brahmans much more like Socialists to Liberals than like Liberals to Conservatives. The Brahmans had worked out in their minds no new complete system, and when they reformed they left the roots of the old order of things in the ground. But in the momentous change from matriarchate to patriarchate they threw all their power and influence on the side of the newer conception. And when, like Kronos to Jupiter, the old gods gave place to the new, it was they who worked out the newer set of ideas--more especially heaven or sun-worship as against moon-worship and all that it involved. We must not forget that a change of dynasty, or of precedence, among the gods was of more importance to men in those times than a change of dynasty among earthly kings. And though the Buddhists it is true, as we ourselves now, cared for none of these things, and were busied with other discussions than the precedence of the sun and moon, they quite quietly and naturally, when they had to choose, adopted the form of words which did not imply an acceptance of the Brahman position, whose system in other matters they were trying, if not to storm, at least to turn.

We are here in the midst of questions too vast to be discussed with profit in a note. But Buddhism certainly arose among those sections of the community least influenced by the reforms the Brahmans supported. And there is evidence, in the precedence the p. 127 Buddhists gave to women and to the moon, that the older ideas had not, even then, died out. 128:1 These words are repeated before each of the following similes. 128:2 Parinâha, which Childers is wrong in rendering 'breadth,' when not qualified by âyâma (wata œttâwû, says the Simhalese, p. 418). 128:3 Nisâna; karagal, says Hînati-kumburê. 128:4 Satthaka, see Kullavagga V, 11, 1. 128:5 The mythic fairy elephant of the Kakkavatti (not a snake king as Prof. E. Müller has it, 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1888, p. 16). See my note at 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 254. 128:6 Sattappatthito. The Simhalese merely repeats this ambiguous word (compare IV, 8, 57). 129:1 Suppena vâ sarâvena vâ. Hînati-kumburê renders the first of these words by kullaka, which is a winnowing-basket; and the second by malâwaka, which I do not understand. But the use of sarâva at Gâtaka I, 8, 14 and Sumangala I, 298 seems to me to confirm Childers's rendering. 129:2 Mahâbhûta: 'Yakshas' says Hînati-kumburê, p. 419. Compare above, p. 250 (of the Pâli). 130:1 Nâga-puppha-samaye. Hînati-kumburê says, 'at the time when the Nâ trees bloom.' The Nâ or Nâga is the Mesua ferea, whose lovely flowers, like those of the Champak, are still in special request for laying before the images of the Buddha in Buddhist temples. I am told that these so-called flowers are not flowers at all, botanically speaking, but young shoots. But it is one of the most beautiful sights in a Ceylon landscape to see this splendid forest tree, lofty and wide-spreading as it is, one mass of what look like red blossoms from crown to root. For at the 'bloom time' it casts all its green leaves, and has the appearance of a scarlet bell. No wonder that this was thought supernatural, and that the tree should be called the Nâga tree. Its timber is so valuable that in Anglo-Indian the tree is called the 'Iron-wood' tree. But it may be regretted that the commercial spirit of the European has substituted this hard name for the 'Fairy tree' of the native languages.

130:2 Ugu-vâta, which the Simhalese repeats. 130:3 Compare vol. i, pp. 38, 175. 131:1 Nikkha-sahassam. See my 'Ancient Coins and Measures,' pp. 6, 14; Samyutta Nikâya II, 3, 9, 3, 9 (Gâtaka I, 375, IV, 97; Anguttara III, 73, 3). 131:2 Anuyâyino. Not found elsewhere, and not in Childers. But anuyâyati occurs below (p. 391 of the text) and an ânuyâyin at Sutta Nipâta V, 7, 3, 4 and Tela-katâha-gâthâ 25 (compare 41). Hînati-kumburê (p. 470) has anuwa hœsirew. 132:1 Kula-vemattatâ. Those Bodisats who are to become Buddhas in their then lives may be born either in a Brahman or in a Kshatriya family, but in no other. 132:2 Addhâna-vemattatâ, which is ambiguous, as 'period-difference' may mean different things according to the interpretation given to 'period.' Now the Bodisat theory has never been thoroughly worked out in detail. It is clear from the statements given in pp. 38-58 of my 'Buddhist Birth Stories' that the Bodisat who became Gotama the Buddha was held to have been in existence throughout the whole period in which the former twenty-four Buddhas appeared, and this is probably the 'period' intended. Hînati-kumburê's version (p. 421) is as ambiguous as the Pâli. Spence Hardy gives at p. 87 of his 'Manual of Buddhism' what purports to be a translation of our passage. But it is only a loose paraphrase, and he interprets this 'period-difference' as simply p. 133 identical with the next one in the list, the 'length-of-life-difference'--which must be wrong.

It must be remembered that the Bodisats referred to throughout this dilemma are exclusively men--not those mentioned in the Gâtakas (who are all Bodisats of the historical Buddha), but only those Bodisats who became Buddhas in the same life--that is, the Buddhas themselves before they reached Buddhahood. 133:1 Âyu-vemattatâ. This may be due to either of two causes--in the first place they may be born as creatures whose allotted period of life varies. Thus the Bodisat was twenty times Sakka, the king of the gods; and his life would then have lasted hundreds of thousands of years. But he was 106 times an animal of some kind, and then his life would have been of course much shorter. Again, in his births as a man (more than 350 times, see the table in my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. ci), the average duration of men's lives will have varied, according to Buddhist theory, from many centuries down to only a few years. It is in this second sense only that (with Hînati-kumburê) we must suppose the phrase âyu-vemattatâ to be used--thus excluding all the Bodisats except such as were men. But in the Gâtaka stories the average age of man is (with one or two exceptions) normal. 133:2 Pamâna-vemattatâ, which we must also understand to refer only to the varying average size of mankind, which, according to Buddhist theory, is very great at the commencement, and very small at the close, of a Kalpa. For it is only the men-Bodisats, and only in each series the last man-Bodisat (just before he became 'Buddha'), concerning whom this question of penance could arise.

133:2 Pamâna-vemattatâ, which we must also understand to refer only to the varying average size of mankind, which, according to Buddhist theory, is very great at the commencement, and very small at the close, of a Kalpa. For it is only the men-Bodisats, and only in each series the last man-Bodisat (just before he became 'Buddha'), concerning whom this question of penance could arise. 133:3 Rûpe, which the Simhalese repeats (p. 422), and which cannot here mean bodily form only. 134:1 Katu-vesâragge. They are the confidence that no one--Samana or Brahman, God or Mâra--can reprove him by saying: (1) 'The qualities which you maintain to be those of a Buddha have not been attained by you;' or (2) 'The Great Evils which you maintain to have ceased in an Arahat have not ceased in you;' or (3) 'The qualities which you say are dangerous (in the higher life) are not really dangerous to one who practises them;' or (4) 'The aim which you held before others in preaching your Dhamma will not lead him who follows it to the destruction of sorrow.' The list will be found in the Anguttara Nikâya IV, 8 (where it is probably a quotation from one of the conversational Suttas). But the punctuation in Dr. Morris's edition should be corrected by putting full stops after each viharâmi. Childers gives a different explanation under vesâragga, but his interpretation must be altered to that here given, which is the only correct one.

134:2 These have not been found in any Pitaka text, but Burnouf gives them in a note to the 'Lotus de la Bonne Loi' (p. 781) from the Ginâlankâra. He says the expression dasabalo is found as applied to the Buddha 'à chaque instant dans les textes,' but this is not the case, so far at least as the older texts are concerned. In one of the old verses preserved at the Mahâvagga I, 22, 13, and quoted in the Gâtaka (vol. i, p. 84), dasabalo occurs as an epithet of the Buddha, but among the numerous epithets applied in the Buddhavamsa to the various Buddhas the term does not occur, nor have I been able to find it in the published portions of any of the great Nikâyas. (Ten Nâga-balas are ascribed to the Buddha in Buddhavamsa, p. 39, but these seem to be different.) Buddha-rakkhita, the author of the Ginâlankâra, probably lived at about the eleventh or twelfth century A.D., and Hardy's paraphrase of his interpretations (in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 380, 381) is throughout inaccurate. As therefore it is precisely the growth of ideas about the Buddha that is of prime importance in the history of Buddhism, I give here Buddha-rakkhita's explanation, adding the Sanskrit names as given in the Mahâvyutpatti, § 8:-- 1. Thanâthana-ñâna-balam Sthânasthâna-gñâna-balam (1) 2. Sabbatha-gâminî-patipadâ Karma-vipâka (5) 3. Aneka-dhâtu-nânâ-dhâtu Nânâdhimukti (4) 4. Sattânam nânâdhimuttikatâ Nânâdhatu

Nânâdhatu (3) p. 135 5. Vipâka-vemattatâ Indriya-parâpara (7) 6. Samkilesa-vodâna-vatthu Sarvatra-gâminî-pratipad (2) 7. Indriya-paropariya Samkilesa-vyavadâna-vyutthâna (6) 8. Pubbe-nivâsânussate Purva-nivasânusmriti (8) 9. Dibba-kakkhu Kyut-utpatti (9) 10. Asava-kkhaya Âsrava-kshaya (10) Some of these terms are found in the Dharma-sangraha, Anecdota Oxoniensia, vol. i, part 5, pp. 16, 51. 135:1 Kha-asâdhârana-ñâna, not yet found elsewhere. 135:2 Possibly the above ten with four others. 135:3 The details of these eighteen are given by Spence Hardy in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' p. 381, but he does not mention his authority. Hînati-kumburê (p. 422) merely repeats the Pâli. 135:4 'Of the four Truths' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 135:5 See Gâtaka I, 61. But the whole episode is told in the Pitakas, not of the Bodisat, but of Yasa (Mahâvagga I, 7). 137:1 Upâdânakkhayam patto. Childers says that the destruction of these upâdânas 'constitutes Arahatship.' I know of no authority for this, and it is incompatible with the Buddhist theory of Arahatship that any Arahat should go through such a period of penance as our author supposes the Bodisat to have done after he had reached this 'destruction of the upâdânas.' The perception of the first of the above facts, the impermanence of all things and beings (anikkam), constitute indeed the 'entrance upon the path' (see above, p. 25), and of course the upâdânas are destroyed in every Arahat, but that is very different from Childers's conclusion, which would make the terms convertible.

138:1 Pâtâla-mukham, which the Simhalese repeats. There is a similar sequence in the Samyutta I, 5, 4. 138:2 Aparimita-gala-dharo. Hînati-kumburê, p. 424, has dhârî, which may either be the same in meaning as dharo, or refer to the dhârâ, the streams of water. 138:3 Gopade; not in Childers, but compare Gopadaka, 'puddle,' in a similar connection at Sumangala Vilâsinî I, 147 (where one MS. reads Gopade). 140:1 Kamma is here explained by Hînati-kumburê by karmânta ('such as husbandry or merchandise'). 140:2 On this list of epithets compare above, p. 229 (of the Pâli). 140:3 Kamma-dhoreyyo. The latter word is not in Childers. Hînati-kumburê (p. 427) has karmayama usulannâ wû. It is the Sanskrit dhaureya, and the whole might be rendered 'like a beast of burden whose load is action.' 140:4 Appamâdo--that constant theme of praise and exhortation in the early Buddhist books. 141:1 These words, already quoted above, IV, 6, 20 (p. 244 of the Pâli), are put into the mouth of the Bodisat, after the conclusion of the 'penance,' in the Mahâ Sakkaka Sutta (M. I, 246), which is the chief Pitaka text on the penance (the Dukkha-kârikâ). The Simhalese version here (p. 427) has already been given in the note on the former passage. 141:2 The way to Buddhahood (not the way to Arahatship). This is Hînati-kumburê's explanation, which agrees with the context. 141:3 It will be noticed that (the destruction of the Âsavas being Arahatship, not Buddhahood) this is really no reply.