Book V

b. He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera, [as follows]: Genus proved by recognition. Aph. 91.* Though these [individuals] be uneternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of genus. p. 386 a. Hence, he says, it is not proper to deny [the existence] of genus: And not to be denied. Aph. 92.* Therefore it [genus,] is not to be denied. a. But then [it may be said], recognition is to be accounted for simply by a non-existence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing [recognized]: and let this be what is meant by the word 'genus.' To this he replies: Genus positive, not negative. Aph. 93.* It [genus,] does not consist in exclusion of something else; because it is cognized as an entity. a. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion [of something else]; because 'This is that same' is the cognition of something positive; for, otherwise, the only thing cognized would be, 'This is not a non-jar.' p. 387 b. But still, recognition may be caused by likeness. To this he replies: Likewise not a distinct principle. Aph. 94.* Likeness is not a separate principle; for it is directly apprehended, [as one manifestation of Community]. a. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.; for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness; [the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e.g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either].

a. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.; for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness; [the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e.g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either]. b. The conjecture, 'But then, let likeness be really an inherent power, and not [a modified aspect of] Community,' he repels: p. 388 Nor a peculiar power. Aph. 95.* Nor is it [likeness,] a manifestation of [something's] own power; because the apprehension of it is different. a. Moreover, likeness is not the manifestation of a particular natural power of a thing; because the apprehension of likeness is different from the apprehension of power. For the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing; the cognition of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cognition of a correlative,1 as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence; so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous. Such is the meaning. b. But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have [all alike,] the name, e.g., of jar. To this he replies: p. 389 Nor the relation between names and things. Aph. 96.* Nor, moreover, is it [likeness,] the connexion between name and named. a. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness, [e.g., between two jars].

a. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness, [e.g., between two jars]. b. Moreover: How it cannot be so. Aph. 97.* That connexion [viz., between name and named,] is not eternal; since both [the correlatives] are uneternal. a. Since both the name and the named are uneternal, the relation between them, also, is not eternal. How, then, can there be, through that, the likeness of a departed thing in a thing present? Such is the meaning. b. But then, though the correlatives be uneternal, let p. 390 the relation be eternal. What is to hinder this? To this he replies: Another suggestion repelled. Aph. 98.* The connexion is not so [not eternal], for this reason, viz., because this is debarred by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i.e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term]. a. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally subsists; because, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of connexion; the case being accounted for,—as will be explained,—simply by the natural state of the matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible, if connexion be eternal. Therefore, connexion is not eternal; for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints us with Connexion. Such is the meaning. p. 391 b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence1 between those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified; [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyáya]. To this he replies:

b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence1 between those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified; [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyáya]. To this he replies: The Category of Intimate Relation rejected. Aph. 99.* There is no [such thing as] Coinherence, [such as the Naiyáyikas insist upon]; for there is no evidence [for it]. a. But then [it may be said], the evidence of it is, the perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with a quality which inheres in it], and the unaccountableness, otherwise, of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies: p. 392 This argued. Aph. 100.* Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Coinherence]; since, as regards both alike, the case is otherwise disposed of.3 a. Since, 'as regards both alike,' i.e., the perception of qualifiedness, and the inferring of it, 'the case is otherwise disposed of;'4 viz., simply by the natural state [of the thing and its qualities], neither of the two is evidence for [the imaginary category called] Coinherence: such is the meaning. b. It is a tenet, that, from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that, there is this objection of the atheists, that 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary; where

b. It is a tenet, that, from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that, there is this objection of the atheists, that 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary; where p. 393 it arises, even there it perishes; therefore, no motion is proved to be inferrible from conjunction [of anything] with another place;' [the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground not being that fruit, any longer existent, which appeared to drop from the tree]. To this he replies: Motion is a matter of perception. Aph. 101.* Motion is not a matter of inference; for he who stands very near has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to. a. In Book Second the different opinions were merely mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth; but no particular one was considered. In regard to this question, he denies the view of an opponent: p. 394 The Body is of Earth only. Aph. 102.* The Body does not consist of five elements; because many [heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material. a. He will mention, that, whilst there is but one material, the material of every Body is earth: There is a Subtile as well as a Gross, Body. Aph. 103.* It [the Body,] is not, necessarily, the Gross one; for there is, also, the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one.

Aph. 103.* It [the Body,] is not, necessarily, the Gross one; for there is, also, the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one. a. Senses, [the organ of vision, for example,] distinct from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order to substantiate this [point], he refutes the opinion, that the senses reveal what they do not reach to: p. 395 Connexion between sense and object. Aph. 104.* The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to; because of their not reaching, or because [else,] they might reach everything. a. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with them. 'Because of their not reaching.' For we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to; and because, if they were to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them revealing all things, viz., those intercepted, and the like. Such is the meaning. Therefore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connexion with the distant sun, &c. Such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects simply by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are, themselves, unintelligent;—as a mirror reveals the face. Or [in other words], their revealing an object is simply their taking up an image of the object. b. He repels the conjecture: But then, in that case, the opinion [of the Naiyáyikas,] that the sight is luminous p. 396 is quite right; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance, in the form of rays:

is quite right; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance, in the form of rays: The Sight not formed of Light. Aph. 105.* Not because Light glides [and the Sight does so, too,] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light]; because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications, [to be now explained]. a. The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous, on the ground that light is seen to glide. Why? Because, just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modification. Such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without having at all parted from the body, glides out ever so far from the end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, [and thus smells a distant flower], just so the Sight, though a non-luminous substance, without, indeed, quitting [connexion with] the body, all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded feeler of a polyp,] to a distant object, such as the sun, by means of the species of change called modification. p. 397 b. But what is the proof that there is any such modification? To this he replies: Proof of his theory of vision, that it accounts for the phenomena. Aph. 106.* By the sign of the display of the attained object the [existence of the] modification [which could alone account for that display,] is proved. a. He shows [us] the nature of the modification, to account for the going, though without parting from the Body:

a. He shows [us] the nature of the modification, to account for the going, though without parting from the Body: Of the theory, further. Aph. 107.* The 'modification' is another principle than a fragment, or p. 398 a quality, [of the Sight, or other sense]; because it is for the sake of connexion that it glides forth. a. The modification is not a fragment of the Sight, or other sense, [serving as] the cause of the revealing of objects,—a part disjoined like a spark,—or a quality, like, e.g., Colour; but the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something else than a fragment, or a quality. For, if there were disruption, connexion of the sun, &c., with the Sight would not, through it, take place; and, if it were a quality, the motion called 'gliding forth' would be unaccountable; [for a quality cannot move by itself]. Such is the meaning. b. But, if, thus, the 'modifications' are substances, how is [the term] 'modification' applied to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c.? To this he replies: p. 399 'Modifications' may be qualities, as well as substances. Aph. 108.* It [the term 'modification,'] is not confined to substances; because it is etymological, [not technical, and applies, etymologically, to a quality, as well]. a. Since it is also stated, in Scripture, that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur, whether the Scriptural texts are, perhaps, to be applied distributively, according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this, he says:

a. Since it is also stated, in Scripture, that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur, whether the Scriptural texts are, perhaps, to be applied distributively, according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this, he says: The materials of the organs everywhere the same. Aph. 109.* Not though there be a difference of locality, is there a difference in the material [of which the organs are formed]: the rule is as with the like of us. a. Not through 'difference of locality,' as the world of Brahmá, and the like, is it, again, the fact, that the organs have any other material than self-consciousness; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness; as is the case, e.g., with us who live in this terrestrial world. For we hear, in Scripture, of only one Subtile Body p. 400 [made up of the organs], transmigrating generally throngh the different localities. Such is the meaning. b. But then, in that case, how is the Scripture relating to the materiality [of the organs] to be accounted for? To this he replies: A non-literal text accounted for. Aph. 110.* The mention thereof [viz., of materiality, as if it belonged to the organs,] is because there is [intended to be made, thereby, a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause.4 a. There is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a

a. There is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a p. 401 view to indicating its importance; just as fire is [spoken of as a rising] from fuel, [which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire]. Hence are they [the organs,] spoken of as being formed of the Elements. Such is the meaning. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Element, do the Organs, viz., the Sight, &c., [formed] from the accompanying Self-consciousness, come to exist; as fire, in reliance on the support of earthly fuel, results from the attendant Light, [or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone]. b. As the subject presents itself, he determines the variety that belongs to Gross Body: Varieties of Gross Bodies. Aph. 111.* The heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, and spell-born; such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body, though a rough and customary one]. p. 402 a. It was stated, before, that Body has only one Element as its material. In this same connexion, he observes discriminatively, as follows: The material of Bodies. Aph. 112.* In all [Bodies] Earth is the material: in consideration [however,] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case [treated under § 110].

Aph. 112.* In all [Bodies] Earth is the material: in consideration [however,] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case [treated under § 110]. a. In all Bodies the material is Earth only. 'In consideration of some speciality;' i.e., in consequence of intensity through excess, &c., in the case of Body, as before [in the case of the Organs], there is, however, designation as consisting of Elements, five, or four, &c., on the ground only of there being a support, as in the case of the materiality of the Organs. Such is the meaning. b. But then, since the vital air is the principal thing in p. 403 the Body, let the vital air itself be the originant of the Body. To this he replies: The vital air not the source of the Body. Aph. 113.* The vital air is not [on the allegation that it is the principal thing in the Body, to be considered] the originant of the Body; because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs. a. The vital air, consisting in the function of the organs, does not subsist in the absence of the organs. Therefore, since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the originant of the Body. b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air. To this he replies:

b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air. To this he replies: p. 404 Soul essenial to a living body. Aph. 114.* The site of experience [viz., the Body,] is contructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul]: otherwise, we should find putrefaction. a. 'Through the superintendence,' i.e., only through the operation, 'of the experiencer,' i.e., Soul [literally, that which has the vital airs], is 'the construction of the site of experience,' i.e., the Body; because, 'otherwise,' i.e., if the operation of the vital airs were absent, we should find putrefaction in the semen and blood, just as in a dead body. Such is the meaning. And thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a concomitant cause2 of the Body, through the sustaining of it: such is the import. b. But then [it may be said], it is only the vital air, itself, that can be the superintender; because it is this which p. 405 operates, not the Soul, since it is motoinless, and since there is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. To this he replies: The Soul 'acting by another's actions.' Aph. 115.* Through a servant, not directly, is superintendence [exercised] by the master. a. In the construction of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i.e., immediately, [exercised] 'by the master,' i.e., by Soul, but 'through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs; as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning.

a. In the construction of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i.e., immediately, [exercised] 'by the master,' i.e., by Soul, but 'through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs; as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning. b. It was stated before [Book II., § 1,] that Nature's [agency] is 'for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated.' In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this, viz., 'How can the p. 406 soul be eternally free, when we see it bound?' with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says: Soul ever free. Aph. 116.* In Concentration, profound sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul,] consists of Brahma.2 a. Then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies: Perfect and imperfect emancipation. Aph. 117.* In the case of the two, it is with a seed; in the case of the other, this is wanting. a. 'In the case of the two,' viz., concentration and profound sleep, the identity with Brahma5 is 'with a seed,' i.e., associated with some cause of Bondage, [or reappearance in the mundane state]; 'in the case of the other,' i.e., p. 407 in emancipation, this cause is absent: this is the distinction. Such is the meaning. b. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are evident: but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This objection of the atheist he repels:

b. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are evident: but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This objection of the atheist he repels: The reality of Emancipation. Aph. 118.* But there are not the two [only]; because the triad, also [Emancipation inclusive], is evident; as are the two. a. The meaning is, that, since Emancipation, also, is 'evident,' i.e., is inferrible, through the example of Concentration and profound sleep, there are not the two, viz., profound sleep and Concentration, only; but Emancipation, also, really is. And the argument is thus. The quitting of that identity with Brahma4 which [identity] exists during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through a fault, viz., Desire, or the like, lodged in the mind; and, if this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results p. 408 a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.; and it is precisely this that is Emancipation.2 b. But then [suggests some one, with reference to § 117], granting, that, even notwithstanding the existence of the 'seed' [or source of return to the mundane state,] called Memory,3 a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during concentration, inasmuch as Memory is [then] dulled [or deadened] by apathy, &c., yet, in the case of a person in profound sleep, since Memory prevails, there will really be cognition of objects; consequently, it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahma during profound sleep. To this he replies:

p. 409 Memory inactive during profound sleep. Aph. 119.* There is not the revelation, by memory, of an object likewise during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [such as sleep]: the secondary cause does not debar the principal.2 a. As in the case of apathy, so, also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal its own objects, does not remind us of its objects; for the 'secondary,' the subordinate, Memory,3 cannot defeat the p. 410 more potent fault of Sleep: such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless, incompetent to produce its effects; [and so there is nothing, in this, to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma, during profound sleep, any more than during apathetic Concentration]: such is the import. b. It was stated, in the Third Book [§ 83], that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still living, is 'in consequenue of a mere vestige of impression.'2 To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us, [and this experience continuous,] even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object: now, this is unaccountable [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated]; because the antecedent impression is annihilated, exactly on its having produced the first [instant of] experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as knowledge debars it; just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies:

p. 411 An objection met to the possibility of emancipation in one still living. Aph. 120.* A single impression [suffices to generate, and] lasts out2 the experience: but there are not different impressions, one to each [instant of] experience; else, we should have a postulation of many, [where a single one may suffice]. a. In like manner, in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle,3 called motal inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the completion of the whirling. b. It has been stated [§ 111,] that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external: p. 412 The Vegetable organism really a Body. Aph. 121.* Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]:1 trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [which have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experiencer and experience; as in the former case. a. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body, in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, &c., which have internal consciousness; because, 'as in the former case,' meaning the putrescence already mentioned [see § 114], of the Bodies of men, &c., [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [the living soul], even in the same way do withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c., also: such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture.

p. 413 Law, as well as Scripture, is authority for this. Aph. 122.* And from the Legal Institutes [the same fact may be inferred, viz., that vegetables have bodies and are conscious].1 a. But then, from the fact that trees, &c., also, are thus conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this he replies: Vegetables not moral agents. Aph. 123.* Not merely through a Body is there susceptibility of Merit and Demerit; for Scripture tells us the distinction. a. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. Why? 'For Scripture tells us the distinction:' because we are told, in Scripture, that the liability results just from the being p. 414 distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like [animal body, not vegetable]. Such is the meaning. b. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds: Body of three principal kinds. Aph. 124.* Among the three there is a threefold distribution; the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both. a. There is a threefold distribution of Body 'among the three,' i.e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate,—all living beings,—viz., the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both: such is the meaning. Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the preeminent sages; a Body of experience, to Indra and others, and to things immovable, &c.; and a Body of both, to the royal sages. Here the division is [not exhaustive, but] into three, because of the preeminence [of these]; for,

p. 415 otherwise, we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience, [like Indra]. b. He mentions also a fourth Body: A fourth kind of Body. Aph. 125.* Not any one [of these], moreover, is that of the apathetic. a. That is to say: the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattátreya, Jaḍabharata, and others; for they possessed bodies consisting of mere knowledge. b. In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord, which was stated before, he disproves the eternity of p. 416 knowledge, desire, action, &c., which is accepted by others [as existing in the case of the Lord]: Argument against the existence of a Lord. Aph. 126.* Eternity does not [as is alleged by those who wish to establish the existence of a Lord,] belong to knowledge,2 &c., even in the case of the particular site, [viz., that of the supposed Lord]; as is the case with fire. a. That is to say: just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire,3 also, is not eternal. p. 417 The argument really ex abundantiâ Aph. 127.* And, because the site [viz. the supposed Lord] is unreal, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether knowledge, &c.. may be eternal, or not]. a. But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe; since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]? To this he replies:

a. But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe; since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]? To this he replies: The height to which asceticism may elevate. Aph. 128.* The superhuman powers2 of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid. a. That is to say: by the example of the effects of drugs, &c., even the superhuman powers of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established. p. 418 b. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements; since this is hostile to the establishment [of the existence] of Soul: Argument against Materialism. Aph. 129.* Thought does not belong to the Elements; for it is not found in them separately, or, moreover, in the state of combination,—or, moreover, in the state of combination. a. That is to say: Thought does not exist in the five Elements, even when in the state of combination; because we do not find Thought in them, generally, at the time of disjunction; [and there can be nothing in the product which does not preexist in the cause]. END OF BOOK V. p. 313 3 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed.

3 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed. p. 314 2 See, for a somewhat different translation, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed. p. 320 3 Vyápyatwa, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of vyápti, by which sambandha, 'association,' is interpreted just above. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.' Ed. p. 321 3 Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Vide p. 264, note 4, supra. Ed. 4 Pada, here used for adhyáya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed. p. 322 3 For a different translation of this Aphorism, and of what introduces and succeeds it, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 257, Ed. p. 326 2 Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nágeśa's work omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and following it. Ed. p. 327 1 Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, ii. 4, 12; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 12. Ed. 2 Professor Gough has, 'a pure indifference of thought.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 153. Ed. 4 Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Ed. p. 330 3 The 'great internal organ' (mahat), called also buddhi, is here referred to. See Book I., Aph. 64. a. Ed. p. 331 2 Vide supra, p. 71, Aph. 61. b. Ed. p. 333 3 For the Chárvákas' rejection of the anthority of inference, see pp. 5, et seq., of the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangrana by Professors Cowell and Gough. Ed.

3 For the Chárvákas' rejection of the anthority of inference, see pp. 5, et seq., of the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangrana by Professors Cowell and Gough. Ed. p. 334 1 As suggestive of the correction here required, see Professor Cowell's Aphorisms of Śáṇḍilya, &c., p. 8, text and foot-note. Ed. p. 337 2 The translator's 'the Panchaśikha' I have everywhere corrected. Ed. 3 This is to render vyápyatwa, on which vide supra, p. 320, note 3. Ed. p. 341 3 'Being a means of right knowledge' here renders prámáṇya, represented, just before, by 'as evidence.' Ed. p. 342 3 Instead of 'simply,' &c., read, 'this itself is their connexion, such [a connexion] as [is seen] in anatheticity.' The 'connexion' in question is the swarúpa-sambandha, for which see Professor Cowell's translation of the Kusumánjali, p. 13, note †. A better reading than the one which Dr. Ballantyne accepted from me is, certainly, that which omits the clause rendered, 'to the word, the power termed expression.' According to Nagesa, 'the expressibleness inherent in the meaning is the connexion [intended].' Anuyogin and anuyogitá, as Professor Cowell informs me, are the opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogitá, which latter I would represent, provisionally, by 'antithetic' and 'antitheticity.' Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin, occurs in the comment on Aph. 95 of this Book. It must suffice, here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuyogin,

Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin, occurs in the comment on Aph. 95 of this Book. It must suffice, here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuyogin, p. 343 or 'anathetic,' of ghaṭábháva, 'non-existence of a jar,' is ghaṭábháva itself, and the pratiyogin, or 'antithetic' of ghaṭábháva is ghaṭa, 'jar.' Ed. p. 347 3 'Power to cause right knowledge' is to render prámáṇya. Ed. p. 348 1 Vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed. 4 See Book I., Aph. 93 and 94, at pp. 113, 114, supra. Ed. p. 349 3 'Invariable fact' is to translate vyápti. Ed. p. 350 2 Read: 'Even where an invisible [originator] is in question, that [thing] in respect of which there arises the idea of [its] being made is [what is meant by] a production by a person.' Aniruddha, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva agree in supplying kartari after adṛishṭe. Ed. 3 Instead of Vijnána's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preeeded by consciousness,' Nágeśa has: 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness, i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought. Vedánti Mahádeva impliedly contrasts with a jar, as being a production of an intelligent and self-conscious maker, a sprout, which originates as a factor of a series of causes and effects alternating from the time when vegetation was first evolved. Also see the two aphorisms preceding the one commented on. Ed. p. 351 2 Instead of 'a thing is not Man's work,' &c., I have translated, in the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 65: 'Not from the mere fact of [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness [of a thing] by [that] person; since it is not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person: but, by [reason of its] production consciously, [a thing is said to be produced by a person]. The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue of desert [of souls], issue, spontaneously, from Brahmá, without ever being consciously produced [by him]. Hence they are not productions of a person.'

Dr. Ballantyne was misled by the full stop mistakenly put, in my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, before ###.Ed. p. 352 1 Read, instead of 'since they are,' &c., 'since the true sense of their sentences was not originated consciously.' Ed. 2 The implied 'power to convey right knowledge' represents prámáṇya. Ed. 5 As in the aphorism, prámáṇya, which, soon after, is rendered by 'validity.' Ed. 6 Mantra, a word of various meanings. Ed. p. 356 4 See Book III., Aphorism 66, at p. 267, supra. Ed. p. 357 2 The text followed, in this paragraph is, throughout, very inferior; and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. See, for the purer text, pp. 23, 24, of the Appendix to my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Ed. p. 359 1 For sphoṭa, 'eternal word,' which the translator renders by 'expresser,' and also by 'expressien,' see Professor Cowell's edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 331, foot-notes 2 and 3; and the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and Gough, pp. 209, et seq. It is likewise observable that, in what precedes and follows, śabda is variously rendered, besides that śabda and pada are not discriminated. Ed. p. 360 1 Pratishiddha, 'demurred to.' Ed. p. 362 3 Vide supra, p. 142, c. Ed. p. 363 2 Nagesa, as also some copies of Vijnána's work, has 'non-duality of souls.' Ed. 4 Chhándogya Upanishad, vii., xxv., 2. Ed. 6 For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed.

6 For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed. p. 365 3 To render anuváda, which, as defined by Professor Cowell, signifies, 'the reiteration or reinculcation of an injunction, it may be with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself.' Aphorisms of Śáṇḍilya, &c., p. 75, foot-note. At pp. 24 and 26, he translates anuváda by 'confirmatory repetition' and 'illustrative repetition.' Ed. p. 366 2 According to Nágeśa's reading, 'Ignorance' is qualified as 'beginningless,' or 'eternal a parte ante.' p. 368 1 The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken, with the addition of its opening word, from the Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, iii., 9, 28; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 6, 9, 34. Ed. p. 369 4 For another translation, beginning with the introduction to Aphorism 67, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 34. Ed. p. 370 1 Dr. Ballantyne, under the misapprehension that 'the subtile body' was pointed to, here added, in brackets, 'in B. III., §§ 14, 15, &c.' Ed. 4 The term manas, the translator's 'Mind,' denotes not only one of the three internal organs, but, sometimes, as here, all three taken together. See the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 45, 46, text and foot-notes. Ed. 5 See Book II., Aph. 30, at p. 208, supra. Ed. 6 The words here bracketed I have substituted for 'the subtile body, mentioned under B. III., § 12, a.' Ed. p. 371

p. 371 1 See Book II., Aph. 26, at p. 206, supra. Ed. p. 373 2 Intended to represent antah́karaṇa, 'internal organ.' Vide supra, p. 370, note 4. Ed. 3 The very inferior, because ambigous, reading, in the original, manas, I have changed to buddhi, and have displaced Dr. Ballantyne's corresponding 'Mind.' Ed. 4 Vyavasáya. For its synonym, adkyavasáya, vide supra, p. 209, note 1. Ed. 6 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, iv., 10. Professor Gough translates differently: 'Let the sage know that Prakṛiti is Máyá, and that Maheśwara is the Máyin, or arch-illusionist. All this shifting world is filled with portions of him.' A foot-note explains 'Maheśwara' as intending 'Íśwara, Rudra, Hara, or Śiva.' Philosophy of the Upanishads. p. 224. Ed. p. 375 2 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unsullied.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed. p. 377 1 See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, b., at pp. 301 and 310, supra. Ed. 3 Vásaná; for which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. p. 388 1 Pratiyogin; on which vide supra, p. 342, note 3. Ed. p. 391 1 Samaváya; of which the preferable rendering, proposed by Professor Cowell, is 'interpenetration.' Ed. p. 392 3 Read, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of,' 'the establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' Ed. 4 See the preceding note. Ed. p. 400

p. 400 4 Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-káraṇa is rendered 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives are 'chief or especial cause' and 'efficient cause.' Ed. p. 404 2 Nimitta-káraṇa. Vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed. p. 406 2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 5 Brahmatwa, the abstract of Brahma. Ed. p. 407 4 Brahma-bháva, the same as brahmatwa. Ed. p. 408 2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 3 Here and below, this renders vásaná, on which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. p. 409 2 The rendering given above is susceptible of improvement; and so, very probably, is that which follows: 'Where, moreover, there is influence from an obstruction [like that offered by sleep], mental impression does not inform one of objects [and, hence, one is then exempt from desires, &c., and in a state identical with that of emancipation]: a cause [of desires, &c.; and such is mental impression,] does not countervail what is predominant, [e.g., sleep, which is, as it were, temporary Brahmahood or emancipation].' Aniruddha's interpretation of this obscure aphorism, possibly by reason of his elliptical mode of expression, is far from clear. His view of its sense is, certainly, peculiar. Ed. 3 Sanskára, here used as synonymous with vásaná. Ed. p. 410 2 Here, and often below, 'impression' is to render sanskára. Ed. p. 411 2 Read, instead of 'lasts out,' 'brings about.' Ed.

3 This phrase is meant to translate sanskára. Ed. p. 412 1 Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva here end one aphorism, and treat what follows as a second. Vijnána formally defends the reading to which he gives the preference. Ed. p. 413 1 Nágeśa pretty evidently does not regard these words as an aphorism. Ed. p. 416 2 Buddhi, rendered 'intellect' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Ed. 3 The world, viewed as Brahmá's egg, is fabled to be surrounded by seven envelopes. One of these is the ávaraṇa-tejas, Dr. Ballantyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the Vishṇu-puráṇa (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof. Cowell for this reference. Ed. p. 417 2 Vide supra, p. 310, note 4. Ed.