Book I

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;' and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration: such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ (see § 100. b.)] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul, [which is called,] 'knowledge by hearing' (śabda-bodha). b. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence: Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth. Aph. 102.* Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence, the decaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here made]. a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct, [the one from the p. 124 other]: therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here declared: such is the meaning. b. Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes that one by which, especially, viz., by a proof which is one kind of inference, Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively: The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy. Aph. 103.* The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy. a. [Analogy (sámányato dṛishṭa) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument,] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where, under such circumstances, we repeat,] anything of a different kind, i.e., not cognizable by the senses, is established; as when,

p. 125 for example, having apprehended a constant accompaniment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledge, viz., [the instrument named] Sense, is established [or inferred to exist]; such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this [species of inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul are proved [to exist]: such is the meaning. b. Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows: the Great Principle [viz., Understanding (see § 61. c.)] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise (see § 61) the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it is [undeniably,] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like; [has the characteristic properties p. 126 of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold, or the like]. c. But, [as regards tht argument from analogy, in proof of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under § 66, to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another; because it is something that acts as a combination; as a house, for instance, [which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, is inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself]: such is the meaning.

d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies: p. 127 When it is that experience ceases. Aph. 104.* Experience [whether of pain or pleasure, ends with the discernment of] Thought, [or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature]. a. By 'Thought' [we mean] soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] ceases, on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [see Tarka-sangraha, § 92], surceases [when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be], so, eternal Nature [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning,] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul]; so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] does not at all times occur: such is the state of the case. b. [But some one say], if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow [which seems unreasonable,] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies: The fruit of the action is not always the agent's. Aph. 105.* The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c. p. 128 a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof, i.e., the fruit of the cook's actions], so is the case here, also.

a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof, i.e., the fruit of the cook's actions], so is the case here, also. b. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, in practice, to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose principles it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine, [in regard to the doubt started under § 104. b.]: To suppose that Soul acts and experiences is an error. Aph. 106.* Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion]. a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. b.)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination;' that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences the fruit; [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure]. p. 129 b. The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in § 106,] he states [as follows]: Soul is really neither agent nor experiencer.

Soul is really neither agent nor experiencer. Aph. 107.* And, when the truth is told, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience]. a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i.e., when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire distinctness, one from the other], 'there is neither,' i.e., neither the condition [as regards soul,] of an agent nor that of a patient. b. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence: p. 130 What is perceptible, under certain circumstances, may be imperceptible, under others. Aph. 108.* [A thing may be] an object [perceptible], and also [at another time,] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the thing]. a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. [A thing may be] not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i.e., through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c. What may prevent perception. b. [To explain the '&c.,' and to exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark, that] it is in consequence of great distance, that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived; [then again,] in consequence of extreme proximity, the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]; a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived], in consequence of the obstruction; from distraction of mind, the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose]; through its subtilty,

p. 131 an atom [is not perceived]; nor is a very small sound, when overpowered by the sound of a drum; and so on. c. How [or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated,] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this, he declares: The subtility of Nature. Aph. 109.* Her imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtility. a. 'Her,' i.e., Nature's, imperceptibleness is from subtilty. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate; not [as a Naiyáyika might, perhaps, here prefer understanding the term,] the consisting of atoms; for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive. p. 132 b. How, then, [it may be asked,] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies: Nature inferred from the existence of productions. Aph. 110.* [Nature exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions. a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [which are agglomerations], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities; [(see § 62. a.) and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity]. b. Some [the Vedántís,] say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon:

b. Some [the Vedántís,] say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon: p. 133 A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature, by the contradiction of dissentients. Aph. 111.* If [you throw out the doubt that] it [viz., the existence of Nature,] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism]. a. 'Because of the the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], it is not established,' i.e., Nature [as asserted by the Sánkhyas,] is not established. b. But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product], then an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for,] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof; since you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] accompanier of an effect; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.], that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production; well,] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning [of the aphorism]. c. He states [his] doctrine [on this point]: p. 134 Mutual denials settle nothing. Aph. 112.* Still, since1 each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

Aph. 112.* Still, since1 each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive]. a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you,] there is dissent against the other side, too: so how could it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier, on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it], it is the same with my [side], also: therefore [my] inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied [in this peremptory fashion]. b. Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted; how is it that this [cause] is Nature, and nothing else, [such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies: p. 135 Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears. Aph. 113.* Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature,] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit]. a. Quality is threefold [see § 61. a.], viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness: there would be a contradiction to these: such is the meaning. b. The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognizable in the world; [because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause, and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

b. The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognizable in the world; [because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause, and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms]. c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently], or of what did not exist: p. 136 What never existed will never exist. Aph. 114.* The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place. a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced. b. He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity: A product cannot be of nothing. Aph. 115.* Because of the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may consist]. a. And only when both are extant is there, from the presence of the cause, the presence of the effect. Otherwise, everywhere and always, every [effect] might be produced; [the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows]: p. 137 Else, anything might occur at any time, anywhere.

Else, anything might occur at any time, anywhere. Aph. 116.* Because everything is not possible everywhere and always [which might be the case] if materials could be dispensed with]. a. That is to say: because, in the world, we see that everything is not possible, i.e., that everything is not produced; 'everywhere,' i.e., in every place; 'always,' i.e., at all times. b. For the following reason, also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not [antecedently]: Effects preexist, potentially, in their causes. Aph. 117.* Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible, [as a product of it]. a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it, potentially, i.e., of] having the competency to be the product; and [this] competency is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass: therefore, since 'that which is competent,' viz., the cause, makes the product which is 'possible' [to be made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes p. 138 place, [but of an entity, whose esse, antecedently, was possibility]: such is the meaning. b. He states another argument: The product is nothing else than the cause. Aph. 118.* And because it [the product,] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the shape of the product]. a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning.

a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning. b. He ponders a doubt:. A doubt whether that which is can be said to become. Aph. 119.* If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that's becoming which already is [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism]. p. 139 a. That is to say: but then, if it be thus [that every effect exists antecedently to its production], since the effect [every effect,] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of becoming, the adjunction of arising, in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity; because the employment of [the term] 'arising' [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did not exist [previously]; if this be urged: such is the meaning. b. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]: Production is only manifestation; and so of the opposite. Aph. 120.* No; [do not argue that what is cannot become; for] the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced, or not]. a. 'No;' the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning.

a. 'No;' the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning. b. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., p. 140 so, by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into manifestness; [whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden, [and no longer appears as a pot]. c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours; for it] is seen; for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, which resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of husked rice, from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c. d. Therefore, the employment and the non-employment of the [term] 'the production of an effect' are dependent on manifestation, dependent on the manifestation of the effect: that is to say, the employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced]; and the non-employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is, therefore, not spoken of as produced]; but [the employment of the term 'production' is] not in consequence of that's becoming an entity which was not an entity. p. 141 e. But if [the employment of the term] 'production' is occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction?1 To this he replies:

e. But if [the employment of the term] 'production' is occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction?1 To this he replies: What is meant by destruction. Aph. 121.* Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced]. a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [i.e., into the particles of clay which constituted the jar], to this are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction,' and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to anything [which is termed its destruction].4 p. 142 b. [But some one may say], if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or παλιγγενεσία] of it might be seen; and this is not seen: well [we reply], it is not seen by blockheads; but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]; and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities. c. Pray [some one may ask], is [this] manifestation [that you speak of under § 120] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived; and, if it be not real, then there would be the absence of [all] products, [in the absence of all manifestation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real; and] there must be [in order to give rise to it,] another manifestation of it, and of this another; [seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,

p. 143 on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]; and thus we have a regressus in infinitum. To this he replies: How manifestation may occur without being an entity. Aph. 122.* Because they seek each other reciprocally,3 as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate manifestation, from eternity to eternity]. a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations; still there is no fault; for there is no starting-point; as is the case with seed and plant, [which people may suppose to have served, from eternity, as sources, one to another, reciprocally]. p. 144 b. He states another argument: The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted. Aph. 123.* Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your theory of] 'production.' a. Pray [let us ask], is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production; so that there is a regressus in infinitum, [such as you allege against our theory, under § 121. c.] If it be not produced, then, pray, is this because it is unreal, or because it is eternal? If because it is unreal, then production never is at all; so that it would never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced,] because it is eternal, then there would be at, all times, the production of [all possible] effects, [which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say, since 'production' itself consists of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]? then, in like manner, [I ask,] since 'manifestation' itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours, also; [and

p. 145 thus every objection stated or hinted under § 121. c., is capable of being retorted]. b. He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature, mutually: The characters common to all products. Aph. 124.* [A product of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent. a. 'Caused,' i.e. having a cause. 'Uneternal,' i.e., destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i.e., not present everywhere. 'Mutable,' i.e., distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form], and assuming [another form], &c. It [the soul,] leaves the body it has assumed, [and, probably, takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous,' i.e., in consequence of the distinction of souls; [every man, e.g., having a separate body]. 'Dependent,' [i.e.,] on its cause. 'Mergent,' that is to say, it [i.e., every product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it originated. p. 146 b. [But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas enumerate (see § 61), and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing; you accordingly giving up what you see, [in order to save an hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he replies: The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature. Aph. 125.* There is the establishment of these [twenty-four 'Qualities' of the Nyáya, which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another point of view,] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

p. 147 a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles, 'in reality,' truly, quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]—' there is the establishment of these,' i.e., there is their establishment [as realities,] through their being implied just in those [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya]. b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because they are hinted by [the term] Nature;' that is to say, the qualities, &c. [such as Knowledge], are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that [these] qualities are, mediately, products of Nature; for there is no difference between product and cause. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all. c. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products agree: p. 148 The characters common to Nature and her products. Aph. 126.* Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are irrational, &c., [is the common property]. a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression '&c.' is meant [their] being intended for another, [see § 66]. 'Of both,' i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning:

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression '&c.' is meant [their] being intended for another, [see § 66]. 'Of both,' i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning: b. He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent] parts of Nature: In what the three Qualities differ. Aph. 127.* The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character mutually by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves]. a. 'Pleasantness,' i.e., Pleasure. By the expression p. 149 '&c.' is meant Goodness (sattwa), which is light [i.e., not heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,' i.e., Pain. By the expression '&c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion (rajas), which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,' i.e., stupefaction. By the expression '&c.' is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism]. b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree: In what respects the Qualities agree, as well as differ. Aph. 128.* Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ.

Aph. 128.* Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ. a. The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the p. 150 shape of the term laghu, 'light,' is not one intended to call attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but] is one where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz., 'lightness' (laghutwa)] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,' i.e., through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the Qualities differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over another, from time to time], producing one another, consorting together, and being reciprocally present, [one in another], for the sake of Soul. b. By [the expressions, in § 124,] 'caused,' &c., it is declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products. He states the proof of this: Proof that Mind &c. are products. Aph. 129.* Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities], Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the like. a. That is to say: like a jar, or the like, Mind and the p. 151 rest are products; because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul. b. He states another reason: A second proof. Aph. 130.* Because of [their] measure, [which is a limited one].

Aph. 130.* Because of [their] measure, [which is a limited one]. a. That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]; because they are limited in measure; [whereas the only two that are uncaused, viz., Nature and Soul, are unlimited]. b. He states another argument: A third proof. Aph. 131.* Because they conform [to Nature]. a. [Mind and the rest are products]; because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature; i.e., because the Qualities of Nature [§ 61] are seen in all things: [and it p. 152 is a maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from the cause and implies the cause]. b. He states the same thing, [in the next aphorism]: A fourth proof. Aph. 132.* And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught]. a. It is by the power of its cause, that a product energizes, [as a chain restrains an elephant, only by the force of the iron which it is made of]; so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature,] powerless, produce their products in subservience to Nature. Otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products, [which it will not be alleged that they do]. b. And the word iti, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind and the others should be regarded as products]. c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] the argument from negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn

c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] the argument from negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn p. 153 from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others, when they are not products]: Converse proof of the same. Aph. 133.* On the quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself]. a. Product and non-product; such is the pair or alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof;' i.e., when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product, Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul; [these two alone being non-products]. b. [But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]: p. 154 Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor non-product. Aph. 134.* If they were other than these two they would be void; [seeing that there is nothing self-existent, besides soul and Nature]. a. If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two,' i.e., than product or non-product [§ 133], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,' i.e., in the shape of nonentity. b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies:

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies: What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects. Aph. 135.* The cause is inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products]; because it accompanies it. a. That [other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed, where the nature [or p. 155 essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect; as [is the case with] the inference, from the rising of the moon, that the sea is swollen [into full tide; rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause, moon-rise, is not seen in the effect, tide; and, consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. But, in the present case, since we see, in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it,' i.e., because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature, [i.e., Nature herself actually present; as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar, actually present in the jar].

b. [But it may still be objected,] if it be thus, then let that principle itself, the 'Great one' [or Mind], be the cause of the world: what need of Nature? To this he replies: p. 156 How Mind must have an antecedent. Aph. 136.* The indiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect. [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature]. a. 'It is resolved;' such is the import of [the term] linga, [here rendered] 'effect.' From that [resolvable effect], viz., the 'Great principle' [or Mind], in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great principle,' in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i.e., since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable, [in other words, its 'cause,' here analogously termed lingin, since 'effect' has been termed linga]. b. But then, [some one may say], still something quite different may be the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of yours]? In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]: p. 157 Why Nature, and nothing else, must be the root of all. Aph. 137.* There is no denying that it [Nature,] is; because of its effects, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source]. a. Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause, there would be a regressus in infinitum. If effects be from any root [to which there is nothing antecedent], then this is that [to which we give the name of Nature]. 'Because of its effects,' that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it is,' i.e., that Nature is.

b. Be it so, [let us grant,] that Nature is; yet [the opponent may contend,] Soul positively cannot be; for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has no products. In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]: p. 158 It is not from any effect that Soul is inferred. Aph. 138.* [The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute]. a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing,' i.e., as to there being Soul, simply; [since everybody who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind]; for the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being], as [whether it be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, or not all-pervading, and so forth; just as, in every [philosophical system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma); for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices, according to the Mímáṅsá creed, or good works, according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.' b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e., the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends, 'I will mention another means of establishing it.'

b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e., the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends, 'I will mention another means of establishing it.' p. 159 c. [But some one may say,] Souls are nothing else than the body, and its organs, &c.: what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies: Materialism scouted. Aph. 139.* Soul is something else than the body, &c. a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain. b. He propounds an argument in support of this: The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible. Aph. 140.* Because that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the sake of some other, [not discerptible]. a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus ad infinitum. b. And combinedness [involving (see § 67) discerptibleness,] p. 160 consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture; or [to express it otherwise,] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard, [which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Nature, as well as the rest; because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &c. c. He elucidates this same point: Soul presents no indication of being material.

Soul presents no indication of being material. Aph. 141.* [And Soul is something else than the body, &c.]; because there is [in Soul,] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c. a. Because there is, in Soul, 'the reverse of the three Qualities,' &c., i.e., because they are not seen [in it]. By the expression '&c.' is meant, because the other characters of Nature, also, are not seen [in soul]. b. He states another argument: p. 161 Another proof that Soul is not material. Aph. 142.* And [Soul is not material;] because of [its] superintedence [over Nature]. a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being; and Nature is unintelligent: such is the meaning. b. He states another argument: Another proof. Aph. 143.* [And Soul is not material;] because of [its] being the experiencer. a. It is Nature that is experienced; the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism,] is made, because of the fact that the reflexion of the Intellect befalls it, [and thus makes it seem as if it experienced (see § 58. a.)]. b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the Soul, or of Nature; p. 162 [since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this be replies: For Soul, not Nature, is Liberation wanted. Aph. 144.* [It is for Soul, and not for Nature;] because2 the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not].

Aph. 144.* [It is for Soul, and not for Nature;] because2 the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not]. a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated]; because the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind], and because it would thus prove to be not eternal, [whereas, in reality, it is eternal]. The isolation (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, [and not constitutive (see § 58. a.)]; and that is Soul. b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies: p. 163 The nature of the Soul. Aph. 145.* Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest]. a. It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light; [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were unintelligent [as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be, in substance; knowledge being, by them, regarded not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities], then there would need to be another light for it; and, as the simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of light. b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two following texts from the Bṛihadáraṉyaka Upanishad2]: 'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'

b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two following texts from the Bṛihadáraṉyaka Upanishad2]: 'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?' c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge,] let Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but have Intelligence as its p. 164 attribute. Thereby it manifests all things; but it is not, essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies: Soul has no quality Aph. 146.* It [Soul,] has not Intelligence as its attribute; because it is without quality. a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be, that is associated with attributes,] liable to alteration; and, therefore, there would be no Liberation; [its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other; or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable]. b. He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this, [i.e., in the view which he is contending against]: Scripture is higher evidence than supposed intuition. Aph. 147.* There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence or qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary]. p. 165 a. The text, 'For this Soul is uncompanioned,'1 &c., would be confuted, if there were any annexation of qualities [to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

a. The text, 'For this Soul is uncompanioned,'1 &c., would be confuted, if there were any annexation of qualities [to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment]. b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that the fact, established by Scripture, of its [i.e., soul's,] being devoid of qualities, &c., cannot be denied; because the Scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof, i.e., the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c., [in the soul]. Argument against the soul's being unintelligent. Aph. 148.* [If soul were unintelligent,] it would not be witness [of its own comfort,] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c. a. If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness, a knower. But that this is not p. 166 the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that 'I slept pleasanty.' By the expression '&c.' [in the aphorism,] dreaming is included. b. The Vedántís say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish:' 'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (śakti), i.e., Illusion (máyá), but not through its own essence, [to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says [as follows]: There is a multiplicity of souls. Aph. 149.* From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

Aph. 149.* From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred]. a. 'Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i.e., from their being appointed; [birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls;' that is to say, souls p. 167 are many. If soul were one only, then, when one is born, all must be born, &c. b. He ponders, as a doubt, the opinion of the others, [viz., of the Vedántís]: The view of the Vedánta on this point. Aph. 150.* [The Vedántís say, that,] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly,] to the one [Soul]; as is the case with Space, by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy]. a. As Space is one,—[and yet], in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, [as] jars, &c., when a jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said, 'the jar's space is destroyed' [for then there no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];3—so, also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof, [i.e., of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body], it is merely a way of talking [to say], 'The soul has perished.' [This, indeed, is so far true, that there is really no perishing of Soul; but p. 168 then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls. [And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the appointment of birth and death?

then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls. [And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the appointment of birth and death? b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt [as to the point in question]: Refutation of the Vedánta on this point. Aph. 151.* The investment is different, [according to the Vedántís], but not that to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen]. a. 'The investment is different,' [there are diverse bodies of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs,' i.e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body, in all its multiplicity,] belongs, is not different, [but is one only]: such is the meaning. And, [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else; because this [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed,] would present itself where it ought not;3 [the destruction of Devadatta, p. 169 e.g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not, for that reason, to be assumed to be dead]: and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of in consistent conditions is quite evident; since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot,] belong [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedántí may seek to avail himself, as an illustration,] are not contradictory; for Conjunction is not pervasion; [whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation as affecting another portion; as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree, without being in conjunction with the stem].

b. What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies: The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open. Aph. 152.* Thus, [i.e., by taking the Sánkhya view,] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul p. 170 supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad]. a. 'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul 'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one, [i.e., as a monad]. b. [But, the Vedántí may contend,] we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies: Imputation is not proof. Aph. 153.* Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity]. a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor p. 171 death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is uncompanioned, [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions].

death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is uncompanioned, [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions]. b. [But the Vedántí may say:] and thus there will be an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that, 'Brahma is one without a second:'2 'There is nothing here diverse; death after death does he [deluded man,] obtain, who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.'3 To this he replies: Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically. Aph. 154.* There is no opposition to the Scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul]; because the reference [in such texts,] is to the genus, [or to Soul in general]. a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter,] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the Oneness of Soul; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus. p. 172 By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature: and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning, by its indivisibleness, the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts]; because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible]: such is the meaning. b. But then, [the Vedántí may rejoin,] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies:

b. But then, [the Vedántí may rejoin,] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies: p. 173 The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom. Aph. 155.* Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].3 a. By whom is known 'the cause of bondage,' viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 'by the perception' [of it], i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is 'that condition,' viz., the condition of isolation, [the condition (see § 144) after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground]. p. 174 b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántí,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that soul is one, but not that of soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies:

b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántí,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that soul is one, but not that of soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies: He jeers at the Vedántí Aph. 156.* No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive? a. What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you do not see them]: such is the meaning.' b. He declares, for the following reason, also, that souls are many: p. 175 Scripture proof that Souls are many. Aph. 157.* Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the Vedántic sense]. a. In the Puráṉas, &c., we hear, Vámadeva has been liberated,' 'Śuka has been liberated,' and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory. b. [But the Vedántí may rejoin:] on the theory that Souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, the Vedántí flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya], To this he replies:

p. 176 As it has been, so will it be. Aph. 158.* Though it [the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore]. a. Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation [of all Souls, so as to leave a void]. b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]: The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever. Aph. 159.* As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things]. a. Since souls are [in number,] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence,] a cutting short of the world. As now, so everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there p. 177 will be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting short [of the world]; since of this the on-flowing is eternal. b. On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§ 157. b.], we should find a universal void; so that the doubt2 is alike, [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things, on the successive liberation of many souls, so, since all adjuncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body, as its adjunct,] came to an end, the world would become void, [on the Vedánta theory, as well as on the Sánkhya].

c. Now, [if the Vedántí says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the same, on the theory that Souls are many. And thus [it has been declared]:4 'For this very reason, indeed, though those who are knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature p. 178 and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.' d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence,] departed, then it [Soul,] would [cease, with the cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation,] are unmeaning. To this he replies: p. 179 Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways. Aph. 160.* It [Soul,] is altogether free [but seemingly] multiform [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].3 a. It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, [see § 19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom,] is effected by meditation, &c., [which are, therefore, not unmeaning, as alleged in § 159. d.]. b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness.2 Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there

b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness.2 Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there p. 180 is no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies: How Soul is a spectator. Aph. 161.* It [Soul,] is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it, on liberation]. a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connexion therewith, it [Soul,] is a witness. And where is [its] connexion with sense-organs, [these products of Nature (see § 61)], when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place? b. [Well, some one may ask], at all times of what nature is Soul? To this he replies: p. 181 The real condition of Soul. Aph. 162.* [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.5 a. 'Constant freedom:' that is to say; Soul is, positively, always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 19]; because Pain and the rest are modifcations of Understanding, [which (see § 61) is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct]. Soul's indifference. Aph. 163.* And, finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure, alike]. a. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered 'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.]

a. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered 'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.] b. [Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture. How is this, [if, as you say, it be not an agent]? To this he replies: p. 182 How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet spoken of as such. Aph. 164.* [Soul's fancy of] being an agent is, through the influence [of Nature],1 from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect. a. [Its] 'being an agent,' i.e., Soul's fancy of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,' 'through the influence' of Nature, [(see § 19,) of which Intellect (see § 61) is a modification]. b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion: for thus do we see [practised] in the Scriptures, [e.g., where it is said, in the Veda: 'Soul is to be known; it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again'4]. p. 183 c. So much, in this Commentary1 on the illustrious Kapila's Aphorisms declaratory of the Sánkhya, for the First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter [of the Sánkhya system]. END OF BOOK I. p. 12 * Instead of 'indestructible' read 'impracticable.' ** Remove the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of.' Dr. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya.

** Remove the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of.' Dr. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. p. 16 3 Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives 'uninterrupted continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga; and that definition, in all probability, suggested 'eternal' to the translator, who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a, in the next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered 'undue result.' For the synonymous atiprasakti and atiprasanga, respectively, see Aph. 53. with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 151. of this Book. Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these terms by 'wrest,' 'straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,' &c. As technicalities, they generally signify 'illegitimately extended application' of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed. p. 17 2 Upádhi, for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed. p. 20 1 This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed. p. 21 1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. Vijnána here supplies the comment. Ed. p. 23 * 'That is to say,' &c., See, for a more correct rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 63. p. 25 * Read, instead of 'your own implied dogma,' 'the dogma which you accept.' p. 29 2 Vásaná, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.' Ed.

2 Vásaná, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.' Ed. p. 36 1 The brackets are of my inserting. Ed. p. 38 1 Vyabhichára is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the translator has given it many meanings; and so has Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by 'contradiction,' 'derogation,' 'failure,' 'impossibility,' 'unoperativeness,' &c. As a logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed. p. 42 3 For vyabhichára, the word used in the original, see 1, at p. 38, supra. Ed. 4 Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term vyabhichára. Ed. p. 43 1 I have inserted the words 'in product and substance.' Ed. 2 The original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is anwayavyatirekau. For other English equivalents of this term, occurring in the singlar number; see Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. Ed. 3 'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated 'successive' in Aph. 38. a, at p. 41, supra. Ed. p. 52 1 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed. * 'That is to say,' &c. For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 119.