Introduction

p. lxx The foregoing story shows that Atman is happiness itself: though the Sankhyas do not avowedly say so, simply because the word is in common parlance applied to worldly happiness. The Naiyayikas also must admit that Atman is bliss itself in so far as they hold that it is even more desirable to attain Atman than to attain the state of Indra and. Brahma. But they avow that in moksha Atman is quite as unconscious as a stone, merely because the inherent absolute consciousness of Atman, manifesting itself when freed from all connection with the body and the senses, is quite different from the ordinary objective consciousness, of limited scope and duration obtained by means of the senses. It is for this very reason that the Buddhist Nihilists look upon Atman as a nonentity in Nirvana. In his zeal to maintain the universal applicability of the doctrine that everything is momentary, the Vijnanavadin, the Buddhist Idealist, is led to conclude that Atman is not a persistent, eternal entity; that He is, on the other hand, a stream of innumerable ever-varying momentary ideas or states of consciousness. In his view, liberation consists in the destruction of illusory objects by right knowledge and the consequent flow in a continuous stream of pure ideas which are independent of one another. The continuity of Atman experienced in liberation is, he says, somewhat like the continuity of a flame.

p. lxxi [paragraph continues] Though Atman's continuity is admitted to be a fact of experience, it is denied by him for the exigencies of a thesis. With a view to firmly establish the doctrine that all external objects are momentary, he spends much ingenuity in showing that whatever exists,—including Atman—exists only for a moment. In thus denying a fact of experience for the sake of an argument, he does not stand alone. The Mimamsakas,—of the school of Bhatta for instance,—in their zeal to demolish the Idealist's doctrine that external objects have no existence independent of the ideas of objects, i.e., independent of the states of consciousness which, as he maintains, are sue generis,—hold that an idea is not a fact of immediate experience; that it is, on the other hand, always a matter of inference only. As against the Idealist, they hold that the forms of objects presenting themselves to consciousness inhere in the external objects themselves, the existence of corresponding ideas or mental states being inferred from the existence of forms which are directly revealed in experience. To the Idealist, as to all others, the continuity of Atman is a fact of immediate consciousness expressing itself thus: ''I who now touch the object am the same entity who tasted it before." For the sake of argument, however, he persists in maintaining that Atman also is momentary. Again, the Mimamsaka holds that Atman is a doer and

p. lxxii enjoyer in himself, while the Vedantin maintains that Atman can be said to act or enjoy only when identified with an upadhi. As the Mimamsaka's main object is to demolish the materialistic doctrine of the Charvakas, he contents himself with showing that there is an entity independent of the body, who does works here and enjoys their fruits in a world beyond, so that all Vedic injunctions should be duly observed as conducing to the enjoyment of heavenly bliss. It does not serve the purposes of a ritualistic doctrine to prove that Atman is in himself pure and immutable, himself not a doer of an action nor an enjoyer of its effects. On the other hand such a teaching would prove prejudicial to the main purpose. The Mimamsakas having expounded their system with the object of supplying a rational basis to the ritualistic doctrine, they cannot be said to be directly averse to the doctrine that Atman in His essential nature is pure immutable Consciousness, Existence and Bliss. 35. Next as to the unity of Atman and the unreality of all else. No doubt, ail other schools of philosophy, such as the Sankhyas and the Naiyayikas, speak of the universe of matter and material objects as real, and assert that Atmans are infinite in number. They, however, declare that when Spirit is liberated, It dwells alone by Itself in Its own light, nothing else presenting itself to Its vision. Moreover, the Sankhyas and the Tarkikas

p. lxxiii teach that liberation is attained .by a knowledge of the true nature of Spirit, and by discriminating Spirit from matter. If, as the result of this knowledge, the whole universe of matter and material objects has altogether vanished away from the vision of Spirit, how can it be said to exist at all, inasmuch as nothing can be said to exist, of which we are not conscious? Thus it follows that the universe has ceased to exist in virtue of the knowledge of the true nature of Spirit. Now, it is only an illusion that can be removed by mere knowledge. For example, it is the illusory notion of serpent which is removed when the rope that is mistaken for a serpent is recognised. It must, therefore, be admitted that the universe which is removed by knowledge is also an illusion. In the Yoga-Sutras, Patanjali says: ''Though removed from the vision of the liberated Spirit, it has not vanished altogether, as it is still perceived by others" (ii. 22). This can only hold good if the Universe is a mere illusion. To one whose eye has some organic defect, the mother-of-pearl appears to be silver, while to another it appears not as silver, but as the mother-of-pearl. That which appears the same to all is alone true. Wherefore the universe also, which presents itself to consciousness so long only as Atman's real nature is not known, and no longer, must be an illusion. Though conscious of this truth, the

p. lxxiv philosopher does not expressly state it in order simply that the student's mind may not get perplexed. If at the very outset the system should start with a declaration of the unreality of the universe, the mind would be perplexed with the question, how can it be? It is only with a view to prevent this perplexity that the universe is spoken of as real. Again, according to the Sankhyas and the Tarkikas, neither the existence of manifold Atmans nor a distinction between Jiva and Isvara is ever perceived by the liberated soul; and they are, therefore, as unreal as the universe. They admit plurality of Atman at the outset with the hope of being better able to explain the varied distribution of pleasure and pain, which in fact is due to variety in the upadhis with which the one Atman is associated. Like the Vedantins, the Sankhyas and others maintain that in liberation Atman alone shines. He is, therefore, in reality one without a second. * 36. This short review of the methods and the fundamental tenets of the various systems of Aryan philosophy and religion is a necessary prelude to the short treatise which, while expounding the main principles of the Vedanta doctrine, also enters into a discussion and refutation of some of p. lxxv the conclusions arrived at by other schools. An attempt has been made to show first wherein chiefly the several schools of philosophy differ and then how finally they all agree. By making allowances for the peculiar standpoints of the several divergent schools, it is possible to construct one harmonious system of Aryan philosophy and religion containing many a strata of thought suited to the various types of intellect. lxxiv:* Vide Madhavacharya's commentary on Suta-Samhita, Yajna-vaibhava-khanda, 8th adhyaya, verse 24.