I. Brahma-gâla Sutta

{1. Sassata-vâdâ. 2. Gotra, literally 'cow-stall.' The history of this word has yet to be written. It probably meant at the time this Sutta was written a family or lineage traced through the father. On the meaning of gotraga (the gentiles of Roman Law) in the later law-books see West and Bühler, 'Hindu Law of Inheritance,' p. 171. 3. Vanna, literally 'colour.' Gogerly renders it 'appearance,' and Neumann 'Beruf.' I have chosen caste (though it is not caste in its strictest sense) because it no doubt refers to the kattâro vannâ mentioned so often in the Suttas. It is true that these--Khattiyas, Brahmans, Vessas, and Suddas--were not castes, but four divisions of the people, each consisting of many subdivisions (by customs as to connubium and commensality) which afterwards hardened into castes. See J. R. A. S., 1897, pp. 180-190.} {p. 28} in times gone by. [14] And he says to himself: "Eternal is the soul; and the world, giving birth to nothing new, is stedfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are for ever and ever. And why must that be so? Because I, by means of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, can reach up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, I can call to mind, and in full detail both of condition and of custom, my various dwelling-places in times gone by--by that is it that I know this--that the soul is eternal; and that the world, giving birth to nothing new, is stedfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and that though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are for ever and ever."

'This, brethren, is the first state of things on account of which, starting from which, some recluses and Brahmans are Eternalists, and maintain that both the soul and the world are eternal. 32. [The second case put is in all respects the same save that the previous births thus called to mind extend over a still longer period up to ten world aeons{1}.] 33. [15] [The third case put is in all respects the same save that the previous birth: "thus called to mind extend over a still longer period up to forty world aeons.] 34. [16] 'And in the fourth place, brethren, on what ground is it, starting from what, that those venerable ones are Eternalists, and maintain that the soul and the world are eternal. 'In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman {1. Samvatta-vivattam (rolling up and evolution, from vatt, to turn). It is the period of the gradual disintegration and conformation of a world. Needless to add that the length of this period cannot be expressed in figures. Neither the idea nor the word occurs in books known to be before the Buddha. But both are Indian rather than Buddhist. Samvarta is found in the Mahâ Bhârata and the Râmâyana; and the later Sânkhya notion of pralaya is closely allied.} {p. 29} is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry{1}; "Eternal is the soul; and the world, giving birth to nothing new, is stedfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and these living creatures, though they transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are for ever and ever."

'This, brethren, is the fourth state of things on the ground of which, starting from which, some recluses and Brahmans are Eternalists, and maintain that the soul and the world are eternal. 35. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists, and in four ways maintain that both the soul and the world are eternal. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such and maintain this, they do so in these four ways, or in one or other of the same, and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at. 36. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. [17] That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations){2}; and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart{3}, realised the way of escape from them{4}, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on; and not grasping after any (of {1. This phrase recurs below, chap. iii, §§ 14, 20. 2. Sîla, for instance, and samâdhi, and all the other things known to a Buddha, says Buddhaghosa, p. 108. 3. Pakkattam. See the common phrases A. II, 198 = S. I, 9, 10, 117; M. I, 188 = 422; M. I, 251, 252 = S. III, 54, &c.; and S. N. 61 I, 906; Mil. 96, 347; Sum. 182. 'Without depending on any one else, himself by himself,' says Buddhaghosa.

3. Pakkattam. See the common phrases A. II, 198 = S. I, 9, 10, 117; M. I, 188 = 422; M. I, 251, 252 = S. III, 54, &c.; and S. N. 61 I, 906; Mil. 96, 347; Sum. 182. 'Without depending on any one else, himself by himself,' says Buddhaghosa. 4. Nirvâna, says Buddhaghosa.} {p. 30} those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free{1}. 37. 'These{2}, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.' Here ends the First Portion for Recitation. CHAPTER II. 1. 'There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists with regard to some things, and in regard to others Non-Eternalists; who on four grounds maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not. 'And what is it that these venerable ones depend upon, what is it that they start from, in arriving at this conclusion? 2. 'Now there comes a time, brethren, when, sooner or later, after the lapse of a long long period, this world-system passes away. And when this happens beings have mostly been reborn in the World of Radiance, and there they dwell made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from themselves, traversing the air, continuing in glory; and thus they remain for a long long period of time.

2. 'Now there comes a time, brethren, when, sooner or later, after the lapse of a long long period, this world-system passes away. And when this happens beings have mostly been reborn in the World of Radiance, and there they dwell made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from themselves, traversing the air, continuing in glory; and thus they remain for a long long period of time. 3. 'Now there comes also a time, brethren, when, {1. Gogerly (pp. 77, 78 in Grimblot) has made a sad mess of this paragraph, misunderstanding the grammatical construction of the first clause, and misinterpreting parâmasati in the second, and nissaranam in the third. 2. Not of course the four speculations, but the higher knowledge which has led him to reject them.} {p. 31} sooner or later, this world-system begins to re-evolve. When this happens the Palace of Brahmâ appears, but it is empty. And some being or other, either because his span of years has passed or his merit is exhausted, falls from that World of Radiance, and comes to life in the Palace of Brahmâ. And there also he lives made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from himself, traversing the air, continuing in glory; and thus does he remain for a long long period of time. 4. 'Now there arises in him, from his dwelling there so long alone, a dissatisfaction and a longing: "O! would that other beings might come to join me in this place!" And just then, either because their span of years had passed or their merit was exhausted, other beings fall from the World of Radiance, and appear in the Palace of Brahmâ as companions to him, and in all respects like him. [18]

4. 'Now there arises in him, from his dwelling there so long alone, a dissatisfaction and a longing: "O! would that other beings might come to join me in this place!" And just then, either because their span of years had passed or their merit was exhausted, other beings fall from the World of Radiance, and appear in the Palace of Brahmâ as companions to him, and in all respects like him. [18] 5. 'On this, brethren, the one who was first reborn thinks thus to himself: "I am Brahmâ, the Great Brahmâ, the Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be{1}. These other beings are of my creation. And why is that so? A while ago I thought, 'Would that they might come!' And on my mental aspiration, behold the beings came." 'And those beings themselves, too, think thus: "This must be Brahmâ, the Great Brahmâ, the Supreme, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are {1. This string of epithets recurs at M. I, 327 in the course of the story of the Brahmâ, named Baka, who is represented as coming to the very conclusion set out in our section. The story was a favourite one, and three recensions of it have been preserved (M. I, 326-331; S. I, 142-144. and Gât. No. 405). Mr. Crow evidently considered himself the Mahâ Brahmâ of the period.

{1. This string of epithets recurs at M. I, 327 in the course of the story of the Brahmâ, named Baka, who is represented as coming to the very conclusion set out in our section. The story was a favourite one, and three recensions of it have been preserved (M. I, 326-331; S. I, 142-144. and Gât. No. 405). Mr. Crow evidently considered himself the Mahâ Brahmâ of the period. The omission in the Dialogue of all reference to the Kesava Birth Story may be a sign of greater age or it may be due simply to the fact that it is not required for the argument there.} {p. 32} and are to be, And we must have been created by him. And why? Because, as we see, it was he who was here first, and we came after that." 6. 'On this, brethren, the one who first came into existence there is of longer life, and more glorious, and more powerful than those who appeared after him. And it might well be, brethren, that some being on his falling from that state, should come hither. And having come hither he might go forth from the household life into the homeless state, And having thus become a recluse he, by reason of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, reaches up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind his last dwelling-place, but not the previous ones. He says to himself: "That illustrious Brahmâ, the Great Brahmâ, the Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be, he by whom we were created, he is stedfast immutable eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and he will remain so for ever and ever. But we who were created by him have come hither as being impermanent mutable limited in duration of life.

[19] 'This, brethren, is the first state of things on account of which, starting out from which, some recluses and Brahmans, being Eternalists as to some things, and Non-eternalists as to others, maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not. 7. 'And what is the second? 'There are, brethren, certain gods called the "Debauched by Pleasure{1}," For ages they pass their time in the pursuit of the laughter and sport of sensual lusts. In consequence thereof their self-possession is corrupted, and through the loss of their self-control they fall from that state:{2}. {1. Khiddâ-padosikâ. They are not mentioned elsewhere except in the list of gods in the Mahâ Samaya (p. 287). 2. Buddhaghosa on this has a curious note. The gods, though of great glory, are delicate in body. A man, having gone without food for seven days even, may restore his strength by the use of clear broth and so on. But the gods can't play tricks with themselves; and it they lose their heads and forget their meal-times, they die--pass away from that state. The poor gods! Whether this be really implied in the text or not, it is at least in harmony with the irony of the Buddha's talk.} {p. 33} 8. 'Now it might well be, brethren, that some being, on his falling from that state, should come hither. And having come hither he should, as in the last case, become a recluse, and acquire the power of recollecting his last birth, but only his last one.

8. 'Now it might well be, brethren, that some being, on his falling from that state, should come hither. And having come hither he should, as in the last case, become a recluse, and acquire the power of recollecting his last birth, but only his last one. 9. 'And he would say to himself: "Those gods who are not debauched by pleasure are stedfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and they will remain so for ever and ever. [20] But we--who fell from that state, having lost our self-control through being debauched by pleasure--we have come hither as being impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life." 10. 'And what is the third? 'There are, brethren, certain gods called "the Debauched in Mind{1}." They burn continually with envy{2} one against another, and being thus irritated, their hearts become ill-disposed towards each other, and being thus debauched, their bodies become feeble, and their minds imbecile. And those gods fall from that state. 11. 'Now it might well be, brethren, that some {1. Mano-padosikâ. Only found here and in the list in the Samaya Sutta. Even there it is almost certainly merely taken from this passage, so that it looks very much as if both these classes or titles of gods were simply invented, in irony, for the sake of the argument. Buddhaghosa identifies this class with the retinue of the Four Great Kings--that is the regents of the four quarters.

{1. Mano-padosikâ. Only found here and in the list in the Samaya Sutta. Even there it is almost certainly merely taken from this passage, so that it looks very much as if both these classes or titles of gods were simply invented, in irony, for the sake of the argument. Buddhaghosa identifies this class with the retinue of the Four Great Kings--that is the regents of the four quarters. 2. Upanigghâyanti, from ghâyati, to burn. Elsewhere found only at Vin. I, 193; II, 269; III, 118, in all which passages it has the connotation of 'covet, lust after.' Buddhaghosa takes it here in the sense of envy, and tells a tale, too long to quote, to show the quarrelsome nature of these gods. In the sense of 'consider' (from ghâyati, to think) the word has only been found at S. N., p. 143. There may have been confusion between the two homonyms, so that ours got to mean 'to consider in such a way as to be excited, to burn.'} {p. 34} being, on his falling from that state, should come hither; and having become a recluse should, as in the other cases, acquire the power of recollecting his last birth, but only his last one. 12. I And he would say to himself: "Those gods who are not debauched in mind do not continually burn with envy against each other, so their hearts do not become evil disposed one towards another, nor their bodies feeble and their minds imbecile. Therefore they fall not from that state; they are stedfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and they will remain so for ever and ever. [21] But we were corrupted in mind, being constantly excited by envy against one another. And being thus envious and corrupt our bodies became feeble, and our minds imbecile, and we fell from that state, and have come hither as being impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life."

'This, brethren, is the third case. 13. 'And what is the fourth? 'In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry: "This which is called eye and ear and nose and tongue and body is a self which is impermanent, unstable, not eternal, subject to change. But this which is called heart, or mind, or consciousness is a self which is permanent, stedfast, eternal, and knows no change, and it will remain for ever and ever{1}." 'This, brethren, is the fourth state of things, on the ground of which, starting from which, some recluses {1. Buddhaghosa explains that these speculators perceive how the organs of sense break up (and sense impressions pass away); but they fail to see that the same thing holds even more strongly in the case of thoughts, since no sooner has each mental impression given rise to the succeeding one than it passes away. Not perceiving that, and depending on the analogy of birds, who fly away from one tree only to alight on another, they conclude that the mind, when this individuality is broken up, goes (as a unity) elsewhere.} {p. 35} and Brahmans are Semi-eternalists, and in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are in some respects eternal, and in some not. 14. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Semi-eternalists, and in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are eternal in some cases and not in others. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such and maintain this, they do so in these four ways or in one or other of the same; and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at.

14. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Semi-eternalists, and in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are eternal in some cases and not in others. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such and maintain this, they do so in these four ways or in one or other of the same; and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at. [22] 15. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge, he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free. 'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.'

'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.' 16. 'There are, brethren, certain recluses and Brahmans who are Extensionists{1}, and who in four ways set forth the infinity or finiteness of the world. And {1. Antânantikâ.} {p. 36} on what ground, starting out from what, do these venerable ones maintain this? 17. 'In the first case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman, by means of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, reaches up to such rapture of heart that he, rapt in heart, dwells in the world imagining it finite. And he says thus to himself: "Finite is the world, so that a path could be traced round it{1}. And why is this so? Since I, by means of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, can reach up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, I dwell in the world perceiving it to be finite--by that I know this." 'This, brethren, is the first case. 18. 'The second case is similar, only that the conclusion is: [23] "Infinite is the world without a limit. Those recluses and Brahmans who say it is finite, so that a path could be traced round it, are wrong{2}."

18. 'The second case is similar, only that the conclusion is: [23] "Infinite is the world without a limit. Those recluses and Brahmans who say it is finite, so that a path could be traced round it, are wrong{2}." 19. 'The third case is similar, only that the conclusion is that he imagines the world limited in the upward and downward directions, but infinite across; he declares both the former conclusions to be wrong. 20. 'In the fourth case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry: "This world is neither finite nor yet infinite, Those recluses and Brahmans who maintain either the first, or the second, or the third conclusion, are wrong. [24] Neither is the world finite, nor is it infinite." 'This, brethren, is the fourth case. {1. Parivatumo. Only found here, Buddhaghosa says nothing. 2. According to Buddhaghosa (Ats. 160) there are four things that are infinite--space, the number of world-systems, the number of living creatures, and the wisdom of a Buddha. Had this doctrine formed part of the original Buddhism we should expect to find these kattâri anantâni in the chapter on the 'Fours' in the Anguttara, but I do not find them there.} {p. 37} 21. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Extensionists, and in four ways maintain that the world is finite or infinite. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such, and maintain this, they do so in these four ways or in one or other of the same; and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at.

21. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Extensionists, and in four ways maintain that the world is finite or infinite. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such, and maintain this, they do so in these four ways or in one or other of the same; and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at. 22. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition: of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free. 'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak:

'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak: 23. 'There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who wriggle like eels; and when a question is put to them on this or that they resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling, and this in four ways. 'Now on what ground, starting out from what, do those venerable ones do so? 24. 'In the first place, brethren, some recluse or Brahman does not understand the good in its real nature, nor the evil. And he thinks: "I neither know {p. 38} the good, as it really is, nor the evil. [25] That being so, were I to pronounce this to be good or that to be evil, I might be influenced therein by my feelings or desires, by illwill or resentment. And under these circumstances I might be wrong; and my having been wrong might cause me the pain of remorse; and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me{1}." Thus fearing and abhorring the being wrong in an expressed opinion, he will neither declare anything to be good, nor to be bad; but on a question being put to him on this or that, he resorts to eel-wriggling, to equivocation, and says: "I don't take it thus. I don't take it the other way. But I advance no different opinion. And I don't deny your position. And I don't say it is neither the one, nor the other{2}."

'This is the first case. 'And what is the second? 25. [The same, reading] '. . . "Under these circumstances I might fall into that grasping condition of heart which causes rebirth; and my so falling might cause me the pain of remorse; and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me." [26] Thus fearing and abhorring the falling into that state{3}, he will neither declare (&c., as in § 24). 'This is the second case. 'And what is the third? 26. [The same, reading] 'And he thinks: "I neither know the good, as it really is, nor the evil. Now there are recluses and Brahmans who are clever, subtle, experienced in controversy, hair-splitters, who go about, methinks, breaking to pieces by their wisdom {1. 'Either in self-training or in the attainment of bliss in heaven,' says Buddhaghosa (p. 115). 2. Buddhaghosa gives examples of these five equivocations. 3. Buddhaghosa explains that if, in his ignorance, he should, by chance, declare the good to be good, he will be puffed up by the approval of the wise. But if he should blunder, he will be filled with vexation and illwill when his error is pointed out. Either of these states of mind will be the fuel to keep. the fire burning, the state technically called Upâdâna, 'grasping.'} {p. 39} the speculations of others. Were I to pronounce this to be good, or that to be evil, these men might join issue with me, call upon me for my reasons, point out my errors. And on their doing so, I might be unable to explain{1}. And that might cause me the pain of remorse; and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me." Thus fearing and abhorring the joinder of issue, he will neither declare (&c., as in § 24).

'This is the third case. [27] 'And what is the fourth? 27. 'In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is dull, stupid. And it is by reason of his dullness, his stupidity, that when a question on this or that is put to him, he resorts to equivocation, to wriggling like an eel--"If you ask me whether there is another world,--well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don't say so. And I don't think it is thus or thus. And I don't think it is otherwise. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is, nor is not, another world." Thus does he equivocate, and in like manner about each of such propositions as the following{2}:-- a.(2) There is not another world. (3) There both is, and is not, another world. (4) There neither is, nor is not, another world. b.(1) There are Chance Beings (so called because they spring into existence, either here or in another world, without the intervention of parents, and seem therefore to come without a cause). (2) There are no such beings. (3) There both are, and are not, such beings. (4) There neither are, nor are not, such beings. c.(1) There is fruit, result, of good and bad actions. {1. Sampâyati. See the note at 'Vinaya Texts,'. III, 317, and compare M. I, 85, 96, 472. 2. Such questions are called elsewhere the common basis of discussions among Brahmans.} {p. 40} (2) There is not. (3) There both is, and is not. (4) There neither is, nor is not.

(4) There neither is, nor is not. d.(1) A man who has penetrated to the truth{1} continues to exist after death. (2) He does not. (3) He both does, and does not. (4) He neither does, nor does not. This, brethren, is the fourth case{2}. [28] 28. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who wriggle like eels; and who, when a question is put to them on this or that, resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling; and that in four ways. For whosoever do so, they do so in these four ways, or in one or other of the same; there is no other way in which they do so. 29. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free. 'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, {1. The word here used is Tathâgata, 'he who has gone, or perhaps come, to the truth.' See Chalmers in the J. R. A. S., Jan., 1898, and compare S. III, 111, 116-118; M. I, 140, 171, 486; S. N. 467. The use of sammaggato (D. I, 55, &c.) and of gatatto (D. I, 57, &c.) shows that gata was used elliptically in the sense of 'gone to the furthest point aimed at' among the followers of the other sects that arose at the same time as Buddhism. The exact derivation and history of the word Tathâgata may be doubtful, but its meaning is, on the whole, clear enough.

2. This is the identical answer put below (p. 57 of the text) into the mouth of Sañgaya Belatthaputta.} {p. 41} sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata; having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forths and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.' 30. 'There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who are Fortuitous-Originists{1}, and who in two ways maintain that the soul and the world arise without a cause. And on what ground, starting out from what, do they do so? 31. 'There are, brethren, certain gods called Unconscious Beings{2}. As soon as an idea occurs to them they fall from that state. Now it may well be, brethren, that a being, on falling from that state, should come hither; and having come hither he might go forth from the household life into the homeless state. And having thus become a recluse he, by reason of ardour and so on (as in the other cases) reaches up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind how that idea occurred to him, but not more than that. He says to himself: "Fortuitous {1. Adhikka-samuppannikâ. This adhikka (which must be distinguished from the other adhikka, derived from adhîyati, occurring at Gât. III, 218 = IV, 301) recurs at M. I, 443, where it is opposed in the sense of 'occasional' to abhinha at M. I, 442 in the sense of 'habitual.' Udâna VI, 5 throws light on its use here. It is there associated with words meaning 'neither self-originated, nor created by others.' It is explained by Buddhaghosa on our passage (Sum. I, 118) as 'springing up without a cause.' The derivation is doubtful.

2. Asañña-sattâ. They spring into being in this wise. Some one of the Brahman ascetics having practised continual meditation and arrived at the Fourth Ghâna, sees the disadvantage attached to thinking, and says to himself: 'It is by dwelling on it in thought that physical pain and all sorts of mental terrors arise. Have done with this thinking. An existence without it were better.' And dying in this belief he is reborn among the Unconscious Ones, who have form only, and neither sensations nor ideas nor predispositions nor consciousness. So long as the power of the Ghâna lasts, so long do they last. Then an idea occurs to them--the idea of rebirth in this world--and they straightway die.} {p. 42} in origin are the soul and the world. And why so? Because formerly I was not, but now am. Having not been, I have come to be." [29] 'This, brethren, is the first state of things on account of which, starting out from which, some recluses and Brahmans become Fortuitous-Originists, and maintain that the soul and the world arise without a cause. 32, 33. 'And what is the second? 'In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations, and based on his sophistry: "The soul and the world arose without a cause." 'This, brethren, is the second case. 34. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free.

'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.' [30] 35. 'These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who reconstruct the ultimate beginnings of things, whose speculations are concerned with the {p. 43} ultimate past, and who on eighteen grounds put forward various assertions regarding the past{1}. And those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of these eighteen ways. There is none beside. 36. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free.

'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.' 37. 'There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who arrange the future, whose speculations are concerned with the future, and who on forty-four grounds put forward various assertions regarding the future. And on account of what, starting out from what, do they do so? 38. 'There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who [31] hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death{2}, and who maintain in sixteen ways that {1. See I, 1, 29 (p. 12 of the text). 2. Literally 'who are After-deathers, Conscious-maintainers.' These summary epithets are meant to be contemptuous, and the word chosen for death adds to the force of the phrase. It is not the usual word, but âghâtana (so read in the text), meaning literally 'shambles, place of execution.' The ordinary phrase would have been param-maranikâ.} {p. 44} the soul after death is conscious. And how do they do so? 'They say of the soul: "The soul after death, not subject to decay, and conscious, (1) has form{1}, (2) is formless{2}, (3) has, and has not, form,

(3) has, and has not, form, (4) neither has, nor has not, form, (5) is finite, (6) is infinite, (7) is both, (8) is neither, (9) has one mode of consciousness, (10) has various modes of consciousness, (11) has limited consciousness, (12) has infinite consciousness, (13) is altogether happy, (14) is altogether miserable, (15) is both, (16) is neither." 39. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death, and who maintain in sixteen ways that the soul after death is conscious. And those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of these sixteen ways. There is none beside. 40. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free. {1. So the Agîvakas, says Buddhaghosa. 2. So the Niganthas, says Buddhaghosa.}

2. So the Niganthas, says Buddhaghosa.} {p. 45} 'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand. tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.' Here ends the Second Portion for Recitation. [32] CHAPTER III. 1. 'There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of an unconscious existence after death, and who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is unconscious. And how do they do so? 2. 'They say of the soul: "The soul after death, not subject to decay, and unconscious, (1) has form, (2) is formless, (3) has, and has not, form, (4) neither has, nor has not, form (5) is finite, (6) is infinite, (7) is both, (8) is neither." 3. 'These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of an unconscious existence after death, and who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is unconscious. And those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of those eight ways. There is none beside. 4. 'Now of these, brethren, the Tathâgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the

{p. 46} way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations. their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathâgata, is quite set free. 'These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathâgata, having himself realised and seen face to face hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathâgata in accordance with the truth should speak. 5-8. [33] [Similar sections for those who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious.] {1}9. [34] 'There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who are Annihilationists, who in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being{2}. And on account of what, starting out from what, do they do so? 10. 'In the first place, brethren, some recluse or Brahman puts forth the following opinion, the following view: "Since, Sir, this soul has form, is built up of the four elements, and is the offspring of father and mother, it is cut off, destroyed, on the dissolution of the body; and does not continue after death; and then, Sir, the soul is completely annihilated." Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.

11. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul--divine, having form, belonging to the sensuous plane, feeding on solid food. That you neither know of nor perceive. But I know {1. §§ 9-18 are discussed by James D'Alwis in 'Buddhist Nirvâna,' p. 47. Comp. Jacobi, 'Jaina Sûtras,' II, 236, 339. 2. Sato sattassa. Insert the word sato in the text (as in §§ 17, 19, 41, 42). The Katha Upanishad I, 20 alludes to such belief.} {p. 47} and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated." Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. 12. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul-divine, having form, made of mind, with all its major and minor parts complete, not deficient in any organ. This you neither know of nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated." Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.

13. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul, which by passing beyond ideas of form, by the dying out of ideas of resistance, by paying no heed to ideas of difference, conscious that space is infinite, reaches up to the plane of the infinity of space{1}. This you neither know of nor perceive. [35] But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated." Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. 14. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. {1. Compare the 4th Vimokha. See Rh. D. 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 52, 213. The idea of resistance, patigha, is here not ethical, but refers to the senses. Having no sense of reaction to touch, of opposition to muscular effort. It appears from M. I, 164 that this was pretty much the view put forth by Gotama's first teacher Âlâra Kâlâma.} {p. 48} For there is a further soul, which having passed beyond the plane of the infinity of space, knowing that consciousness is infinite, reaches up to the plane of the infinity of consciousness{1}. This you neither know of nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated." Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.

15. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul, which by passing quite beyond the plane of the infinity of consciousness, knowing that there is nothing, reaches up to the plane of no obstruction{2}. This you neither know of nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated." Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. 16. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul, which by passing quite beyond the plane of no obstruction, realises 'This is good, this is excellent,' and reaches up to the plane of neither ideas nor the absence of ideas{3}. This you {1. Compare the 5th Vimokha. This seems from M. I, 165 to have been much the same as the view held by Râma, whose son and pupil, Uddaka, was Gotama's second teacher. 2. Compare the 6th Vimokha. 3. Though it is not explicitly so stated, this last of these seven theorisers is no doubt to be considered as believing in all the sorts of soul held by the others, so that he believes in seven. One may compare the five souls each more subtle than the last, made respectively of anna, prâna, manas, vigñâna, and ânanda (food, breath, mind, consciousness, and joy), described in the Taittirîya Upanishad II, 1-5. The Buddhist modification of these theories omits the souls, and treats instead of various states of mind (produced by stages of meditation), the attainment of which, during this life, leads to rebirth in corresponding worlds, or planes of existence, named after those stages of meditations. But the oldest Pitaka texts say very little about it, and the history of Buddhist speculation on the matter has yet to be formulated.

Centuries afterwards we find a somewhat analogous conception in the gradually ascending series of seven, each more subtle than the last (Sthûla-sarira, linga-sarîra, indriya, manas, ahankara, buddhi, and âtman), set out in the Sânkhya texts, and the later Vedânta has a similar series. There is sufficient truth in the idea or the series of seven set out in our text to explain the persistence of the general idea in all the Indian systems, but the details and the application are strikingly different. The text shows that the four Arûpa Vimokhas of the Buddhist theory were regarded by the early Buddhists as derived from closely allied speculations, older than Buddhism, and expressed in almost identical phraseology.} {p. 49} neither know of, nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off, destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated." Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. 17. 'These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who are Annihilationists and in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. [36] And whosoever do so they, all of them, do so in one or other of these seven ways. There is none beside. 18. [Repetition of § 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathâgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.]

18. [Repetition of § 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathâgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.] 19. 'There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of happiness in this life, who in five ways maintain the complete salvation, in this visible world, of a living being. And relying on what, starting out from what, do they do so? 20. 'Hereon, brethren, some recluse or Brahman may have the following opinion, the following view: "Whensoever the soul, in full enjoyment and possession {p. 50} of the five pleasures of sense, indulges all its functions, then, Sir, the soul has attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvâna{1}." Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being. 21. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvâna. And why not? Sensuous delights, Sir, are transitory, they involve pain, their very nature is to fluctuate. And grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and loathing arise out of their inconstancy and change. [37] But whensoever the soul, putting away sensuous delights and evil dispositions, enters into and abides in the First Ghâna, the state of joy and ease, born of seclusion, accompanied by reflection, accompanied by investigation, then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvâna." Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being.

22. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvâna. And why not? Because inasmuch as that state involves reasoning and investigation it is stamped as being gross. But whensoever, Sir, the soul, suppressing both reasoning and investigation, enters into and abides in the Second Ghâna, the state of joy and ease, born of serenity, without reflection or investigation, a state of elevation of mind, internal calm of heart, then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvâna." Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being. {1. Buddhaghosa here (Sum. I, 12') explains Nirvâna as the suppression of pain; pain, dukha, being bodily, as opposed to domanassa, mental. 'In this visible world' means in whatever world the particular soul happens to be at the time. On parikâreti compare V. II, 290 râgâ uyyâne parikâresi, 'the king indulged himself, enjoyed himself, in the garden.' 'All its functions' is added from the Commentary.} {p. 51} 23. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvâna. And why not? Because inasmuch as that state involves the sense of joy, of exhilaration of heart, it is stamped as being gross. But whensoever, Sir, the soul, by absence of the longing after joy remains in equanimity, mindful and self-possessed, and experiences in the body that ease of which the Arahats speak (when they say) 'the man serene and thoughtful dwells at ease,' and so enters into and abides in the Third Ghâna--then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvâna." Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being.

24. 'To him another says: "There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvâna. And why not? Because inasmuch as that state involves a constant dwelling of the mind on the ease it has enjoyed it is stamped as gross. [38] But whensoever, Sir, the soul, by putting away ease, by putting away pain. by the previous dying away both of joys and griefs has entered into and abides in the Fourth Ghâna{1}--a state made pure by self-possession and equanimity, without pain arid without ease--then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvâna." Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being. 25. 'These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of happiness in this life, who in five ways maintain the complete salvation, in this visible world, of a living being. And those who do {1. The text shows that the four Ghânas were regarded by the early Buddhists as older than Buddhism. The very words used are identical; the only modification introduced in Buddhism being the omission of the 'souls.' These four, together with the four Arûpa Vimokhas (see note on § 19), make up the right Attainments (Samâpattiyo), often mentioned in the Gâtaka commentary as practised by pre-Buddhistic recluses.} {p. 52} so, all of them, do so in one or other of these five ways. There is none beside.

so, all of them, do so in one or other of these five ways. There is none beside. 26. [Repetition of § 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathâgata, for which alone he ean be rightly praised.] 27. 'These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who arrange the future, whose speculations are concerned with the future, and who on forty-four grounds put forward various assertions regarding the future. And those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of these forty-four ways. There is none beside. 28. [Repetition of § 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathâgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.] [39] 29. 'These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who reconstruct the past, and arrange the future, or who do both, whose speculations are concerned with both, and who in sixty-two ways put forward propositions with regard to the past and to the future, and those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of these sixty-two ways. There is none beside. 30. [Repetition of § 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathâgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.] [40] 32. 'Of these, brethren, those recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists, who in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are eternal: (2) those who are Semi-eternalists, who in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not:

(2) those who are Semi-eternalists, who in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not: (3) those who are Extensionists, who in four ways maintain the infinity or the finiteness of the world: (4) those who are Eel-wrigglers, who when a question is put to them on this or that resort, in four ways, to equivocation, to wriggling like eels: (5) those who are Fortuitous-Originists, who in two ways maintain that the soul and the world arose without a cause: {p. 53} (6) those who in any of these eighteen ways reconstruct the past: (7) those who hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death, who maintain in sixteen ways that the soul after death is conscious: (8) those who hold the doctrine of an unconscious existence after death, who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is unconscious: (9) those who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious: (10) those who are Annihilationists, who maintain in seven ways the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being: (11) those who hold the doctrine of happiness in this life, who in five ways maintain the complete salvation, in this visible world, of a living being-- That opinion of theirs is based only on the personal sensations, on the worry and writhing consequent thereon{1}, of those venerable recluses and Brahmans, who know not, neither perceive, and are subject to all kinds of craving:

That opinion of theirs is based only on the personal sensations, on the worry and writhing consequent thereon{1}, of those venerable recluses and Brahmans, who know not, neither perceive, and are subject to all kinds of craving: 45 foll. [41, 42] 'Those opinions of theirs are therefore based upon contact (through the senses). 58 foll. [43] 'That they should experience those sensations without such contact, such a condition of things could not be. 71. [44] 'They, all of them, receive those sensations through continual contact in the spheres of touch. To them on account of the sensations arises craving, on account of the craving arises the fuel (that is, the necessary condition, the food, the basis, of future lives). from the fuel results becoming, from the tendency to become arises rebirth, and from rebirth comes death, and grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. It is, brethren, when a brother understands, {1. On paritasita compare M. I. 36 na asati paritassati, 'is not worried at what is not': paritassanâ,'fidgetiness' or 'worry,' at M. I, 136; S. III, 15-19; and Mil. 253, 400. On vipphandita, M. I, 8, 486; Dh. S. 381 (Asl. 253); Gât. IV, 495.} {p. 54} as they really are, the origin and the end, the attraction, the danger, and the way of escape from the six realms of contact, that he gets to know what is above, beyond, them all{1}. 72. [45] 'For whosoever, brethren, whether recluses or Brahmans, are thus reconstructors of the past or arrangers of the future, or who are both, whose speculations are concerned with both, who put forward various propositions with regard to the past and to the future, they, all of them, are entrapped in the net of these sixty-two modes; this way and that they plunge about, but they are in it; this way and that they may flounder, but they are included in it, caught in it.

'Just, brethren, as when a skilful fisherman or fisherlad should drag a tiny pool of water with a fine-meshed net he might fairly think: "Whatever fish of size may be in this pond, everyone will be in this net; flounder about as they may, they will be included in it, and caught"--just so is it with these speculators about the past and the future, in this net, flounder as they may, they are included and caught. [46] 73. 'The outward form, brethren, of him who has won the truth{2}, stands before you, but that which binds it to rebirth is cut in twain. So long as his body shall last, so long do gods and men behold him. On the dissolution of the body, beyond the end of his life, neither gods nor men shall see him. 'Just, brethren, as when the stalk of a bunch of mangoes has been cut, all the mangoes that were hanging on that stalk go with it; just so, brethren, though the outward form of him who has won the truth stands before you, that which binds it to rebirth has been cut in twain. So long as his body shall last, so long do gods and men behold him. On the dissolution of the body, beyond the end of his life, neither gods nor men shall see him.' {1. In the text the first three of these four propositions are repeated, of each of the eleven classes of theorisers. The fourth is put in the form which, to avoid repetition, I have adopted for all the four. 2. Tathâgata, that is the speaker himself, the Buddha.}

{p. 55} 74. When he had thus spoken, the venerable Ananda said to the Blessed One: 'Strange, Lord, is this, and wonderful! And what name has this exposition of the truth?' 'Ananda, you may remember this exposition as the Net of Advantage, and as the Net of Truth, and as the Supreme Net, and as the Net of Theories; remember it even as the Glorious Victory in the day of battle!' Thus spake the Blessed One, and glad at heart the brethren exalted his word. And on the delivery of this discourse the thousandfold world-system shook. Here ends the Brahma-gâla Sutta. Return to top Next: Introduction to the Sâmañña-phala Sutta